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Abstract
This study analyzes the public’s role in the regional water planning process that took
place in the State of Georgia from 2009 to 2011. Specifically, this dissertation analyzes
the extent to which a “consensus-based’ water planning process occurred by 1)
examining the public participation plans that governed how the public was to contribute
to the plan and policy formation, and 2) analyzing the public comments that were
submitted at public meetings and commenting periods. By examining the participation
plans and public comments, this study revealed the institutional, policy, legislative, and
planning structures that influenced public participation in the regional water planning
process. This study found that while the State of Georgia intended for the public to be a
part of the water planning process, but the public’s role was not particularly collaborative
or inclusive. The literature review, theoretical model, and the rubric for assessing the
public participation plans all illustrated what scholars view as the “ideal” for
participation. The examination of the water planning process, however, revealed
systematic issues with public participation, which resulted from institutional design,
facilitator roles, power-sharing, politics, public participation structuring, and process
facilitation. Suggestions to improve future public participation in water planning are
included at the end of this study.

Keywords: water policy, water planning framework, public participation, plan evaluation
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I.

Introduction
In 2008, Georgia’s General Assembly adopted the Georgia Comprehensive State-

wide Water Management Plan, which required an assessment of the state’s water
resources, forecasts of future demands, and the creation of regional water plans (State
Water Plan 2011). The resource assessments and forecasted demands were needed to
create the comprehensive plans for ten regions in the state.
Georgia used a Regional Water Planning Guidance document to direct the
planning process for the ten regions in the state (GA EPD 2009). This guidance provided
the basis for the water planning process and called for sustainable management of water
resources through 2050 and the establishment of ten planning regions governed by
councils (GA EPD 2009, p 5). In addition, the state wanted the water plans created
through a “consensus-based planning process” (GA EPD 2009, p 5). Specifically, the
water planning process required input from several sources: the water planning councils,
the public, and local governments (GA EPD 2009, p 5). Georgia Environmental
Protection Division (GA EPD) oversaw the planning process and offered assistance to the
councils (GA EPD 2009, p 5).
To facilitate this process, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Speaker of the
House appointed council members (State Water Plan 2011). The council’s role was “to
develop a recommended regional water plan for the protection, conservation, and use of
regional water resources and submit it to EPD for adoption” (GA EPD 2009, p 6). The
Regional Water Planning Guidance document also stated that each council had to agree
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to an MOA that outlined their duties; the councils, GA EPD, and Georgia Department of
Community Affairs (DCA) agreed upon this MOA in 2009 (GA EPD 2009, p 6).
To ensure public participation during the process, each water planning council
was required to create a public involvement plan to engage the public, local governments,
water providers, and any other interested stakeholders (GA EPD 2009, p 6). Councils
were also required to coordinate with other councils as well as the Metropolitan North
Georgia Water Planning District (GA EPD 2009, p 6). In addition, each council had a
Plan Preparation Contractor to help facilitate the process (for example, see State Water
Plan 2009). See Table 1 for a timeline of water planning activities in the state.
Table 1: Timeline of Water Planning in Georgia (GA EPD 2011)
Event
Comprehensive Water Management Planning Act passed (permits GA
EPD to create State Water Plan)
Process to create State Water Plan is managed by Water Council and
EPD – regions formed during this time
General Assembly adopts State Water Plan
Regional council members are appointed
All councils meet for a Statewide Regional Water Planning Kick-off
meeting
GA EPD releases Regional Water Planning Guidance
Councils meet 10 to 11 times in their respective regions to create
regional water plans
Joint meetings of the councils (allows regions to discuss draft resource
assessments) – meetings organized by river basin
GA EPD releases draft water resource assessments for public review
and comment
Councils submit draft water plans to GA EPD
Public comment period on draft water plans
Councils revise regional water plans and submit to GA EPD
GA EPD adopts regional water plans
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Date
2004
2005-2008
2008
Early 2009
March 2009
July 2009
2009-2011
January and
February 2010
March 2010
Spring 2011
May and June
2011
Fall 2011
November
2011

The regional water plans were finalized over the summer of 2011, and the public
had an opportunity to comment on the draft plans and provide feedback at that time (State
Water Plan 2011). GA EPD adopted the plans in November 2011, which established
regional water plans for the entire State of Georgia (State Water Plan 2011).

A. Statement of Research Question
Scholars can examine Georgia’s water policymaking process in several different
ways, but this study will focus on the role that public participation played in developing
the state’s regional water plans. With the passage of laws such as the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in1970, the public’s role in policymaking has grown.
As explained by Rydin and Pennington (2000, p 154), the role of public participation
offers an integral insight into how the policymaking process occurs:
“The policy process is seen as a locus for the articulation of values and
preferences on policy options, and public participation is a means of bringing the
pattern of values and preferences represented within the policy process closer to
that existing within society as a whole.”
Understanding the public’s role in the policymaking process is important for several
reasons. First, managing water resources is an increasingly complex and divisive task
(Randolph 2004; Sabatier et al. 2005). Because of the numerous water quantity and
quality disputes and the dissatisfaction with hierarchical agencies advancing initiatives,
collaborative watershed management emerged as a way to involve the public, to find
solutions to problems, and to generate consensus-based rules among the group (Sabatier
et al. 2005, p 6). Second, if the public does not view the planning process as legitimately
collaborative, gridlock can slow or halt the process as tensions between actors are not
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resolved (Connick and Innes 2001). Understanding the public’s concerns reveals the
issues that cause gridlock and aids the creation of better policies and plans (Connick and
Innes 2001, p 10; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 56). Third, stakeholder concerns need
attention because collaborative arrangements are exchanges of information and feedback
between actors; feedback enables the planning process to proceed more effectively
(Connick and Innes 2001, p 9).
Finally, participatory institutional arrangements such as collaborative approaches
to managing natural resources are increasing in popularity, and scholars have called for
continued analysis of these arrangements to examine their effectiveness and the role they
play in the policymaking process (Sabatier et al. 2005). In particular, collaborative
approaches are used to manage water resources (Sabatier et al. 2005). From the
watershed-level in San Antonio, Texas, to the CALFED Bay-Delta region in California,
to the entire State of Georgia, the rise of collaborative watershed management reaches
across many scales and geographic areas (see Innes and Booher 2010 and Sabatier et. al.
2005).
Because Georgia created new rules to govern water in the state using its own
unique process, this case study analyzed the planning and policymaking that occurred.
Georgia was chosen, in part, because it is the first state in the Southeast to undertake
water planning of this magnitude. Consequently, examining the state’s process informs
policymakers and environmental planners who may attempt similar arrangements in other
states. As states like Georgia embark on water planning from a regional perspective,
scholars need to analyze the ways the public is included in the policymaking process
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(Dyckman and Paulsen 2010). Overall, this study views the regional water plans as a
manifestation of the policy process. Using the nuances and constraints of this case study
location, this dissertation seeks to answer how the institutional, policy, legislative, and
planning structures influence public participation in the regional water planning process.
In doing so, this study contributes to scholars’ understanding of water planning
and public participation in the following ways:
1) The “Review of Literature” (Section II) reveals how public participation ideally
occurs in planning and policymaking while also showing how and why
collaborative governance is often used for environmental management and
rulemaking; the review and synthesis establishes the criteria and current models
for participation and public input facilitation.
2) The “Theoretical Model” establishes a water model centered on the Georgia
process. This section continues the literature review by engaging the scholarship
that applies to state water planning. In addition, this model integrates and
improves the broader variables in the Sabatier et al. (2005) model by adding detail
to the variables and by applying other policy and planning literature theories to
develop an overall water model that shows what should have happened in
Georgia’s water planning process (and the public participation within that
process). The Georgia model presents an ideal to test and compare what actually
happened in the state, but the model can also be used as a broader water planning
process evaluation framework. This model can be used nationally for other
states’ water planning; however, the model would need to be tailored to the
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contextual variables unique to the respective state where applied. While this
study focuses on the regional plan-writing and public participation, the entire
water planning process is modeled here to provide context and institutional
influence. The literature discussed in both the literature review and the theoretical
model informs the ideal for public participation in Georgia, and the model also
provides the broader process context and specific relationship to test (in this case,
public participation and plan-writing).
3) In the “Hypothesis and Methodologies” section (Section IV), this study develops
a rubric to analyze public participation plans using plan evaluation literature in
conjunction with collaborative and public participation literatures. While other
scholars have utilized plan evaluation literature and methods to evaluate local
comprehensive and environmental management plans (see Brody 2003a; Brody
2003 b; Berke et al. 2006), this study is unique in using the plan evaluation
literature in conjunction with the participatory governance literature to examine
public participation plans. While the rubric is used to analyze Georgia’s public
participation plans, the model could be applied to other participation plans in the
future. The plan evaluation results are in Section V.
4) The “Hypothesis and Methodologies” section also presents a way to examine
public comments through mixed-methods. A discussion of the public comment
examination is in Section VI.
5) This analysis examines the collaborative legitimacy in Georgia’s planning process
(as defined by the literature), assessing whether public participation varied across
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regions (through a review of public comments) and how the rules for participation
may have facilitated or constrained public input (through a review of public
comments and public participation plans).
6) Finally, this research also explores the extent to which politics and institutional
factors constrained or facilitated participation – see Section VII. This section
provides recommended mandates for state water planning.
This study examines Georgia’s water planning and policymaking in the following
ways. First, a review of literature establishes the challenges in governing water,
background on collaborative governance, goals and challenges in public participation,
institutional mechanisms for public participation, and participatory arrangements and
models. Next, a theoretical model for water planning and policymaking is proposed
using Georgia an as illustration of the approach in practice. Then, the following section
discusses the hypotheses and methods used to analyze Georgia’s use of public
participation in the water planning process. The first hypothesis focuses on the water
planning regions (specifically, each region’s public participation plan) and the second
hypothesis focuses on public comments. Lastly, the final chapter provides a summary
and synthesis of the results of all the analyses.

II.

Review of Literature
This literature review shows broader themes and scholarship on natural resource

governance and collaborative policymaking. The review begins with the unique nature of
water and the difficulties in its governance. The literature provides context for the
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challenges Georgia faced in creating new rules for water, the reasons why public
participation is commonly used in rule-making, the choices and ways public participation
and collaborative management can take place, and the mechanisms and institutional
models that can be used for participatory governance. The literature review is not an
exhaustive evaluation of all participatory mechanisms and models, but is instead a
contextual examination of the mechanisms and models used or hybridized in Georgia.
Georgia’s water planning was unique as a process but possesses many of the elements
contained in other types of collaborative arrangements – this section discusses these
distinctions. The review continues in Section III by discussing additional literature as
applied to the theoretical model for this study. Overall, the literature review provides
broad context of participatory governance while the theoretical model is a tailoring of
literature to test and review Georgia’s plan-writing and public participation.

A. Water as a Unique Good
One of the challenges in managing water is that the resource is so unique. Water
is essential to all living things, and only one percent of all the water on the planet is
available for human use (Marando et al. 2007). Also, the distribution of available water
is uneven across the world and not everyone has equal access to the resource. In addition
to unequal access, water scarcity can be a limitation to economic development, which
causes conflict to occur as cities and states try to secure water for future growth
(Acreman 2006, p 264). Complexities arise in trying to govern the resource because
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access to clean and affordable water is essential to the lives of all people and because
water is an integral part of economic growth.
Water is also difficult to govern because the resource is both a public good and a
private good (Hanemann 2006; Wutich 2009). Water is a private good in that people use
it in their homes, and water is a public good in that everyone can use it for navigation and
recreation (Hanemann 2006). This public/private dichotomy creates a dilemma for
policymakers and planners since the resource has different purposes – depending on the
user. Because water is mobile (it evaporates, flows in streams, moves through aquifers,
etc.) and is variable (it is affected by drought, the seasons, etc.), there is great difficulty in
estimating the resource’s availability for planning and policymaking purposes
(Hanemann 2006; Sarker, Ross, and Shrestha 2008). Governance is also an issue because
water is difficult to store yet expensive to transport (Hanemann 2006).
In addition, water is a resource that is both non-excludable and rival. In other
words, one person’s consumption of water diminishes the amount of water someone else
can consume (rival), and the resource is difficult to keep others from consuming (nonexcludable). Water is a common-pool resource because it is a natural resource difficult to
exclude and rival in consumption (Ostrom 1990).
While water is not the only common-pool resource, scholarship on common-pool
resources can inform discussions of water governance (Sabatier et al. 2005; Gerlak and
Heikkila 2006; Sarker, Ross, and Shrestha 2008). Because of the free-rider problem with
common-pool resources (i.e., people benefiting from a resource without paying for it),
government intervention or privatization are usually the two options considered for
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governance (Ostrom 1990, p 8-13). However, common-pool resource management
occurs in many different ways – not just through centralized or privatized means (Ostrom
1990; Sabatier et al. 2005; Gerlak and Heikkila 2006).
People who use common-pool resources can also govern them (Ostrom 1990;
Sabatier et al. 2005; Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). However, successful institutional
arrangements are mostly small, homogenous groups. As Olsen (1965) argues, unless the
group of individuals is small, people will not usually act in the best interest of the group.
In large-scale institutional arrangements such as Georgia’s regional water
planning, water users’ actions affect those who share the resource, prompting all users to
be reliant on one another for future use (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). When creating
institutions for water governance in a state like Georgia, policymakers must think about
many different types of users at multiple scales. There are costs, not only in creating the
infrastructure and in supplying the resource, but also associated with organizing and
creating institutions for collective action (Sabatier et al. 2005; Hanemann 2006; Ostrom
1990). These costs include creating new institutional arrangements, staying committed to
the institutions over time, and finding ways to monitor activity (Ostrom 1990). The
multiple challenges in governing water (and other natural resources) foster academic
examination of management approaches, as discussed in the next section.

B. Collaborative Governance
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to governing water or any other natural
resource. This study, however, focuses on collaborative governance since many
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common-pool resources such as water rely on collective action by individuals to share the
resource. While collaborative governance is not a new concept (there has been
collaborative governance for common-pool resources for hundreds of years all over the
world – see Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2003), the idea and how it is applied has changed
over time – particularly in the United States.
The concepts of ecosystem management and collaborative decision-making for
natural resources emerged over time because of distrust in administrative agencies and
critiques of positive, empirically-based science (Cortner and Moote 1994; Randolph and
Bauer 1999; Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006). Ecosystem management involves
coupling decisions with public input and integrating management with people’s
preferences and views (Pavlikakis and Tsihrintzis 2003, p 193). Aspects of collaborative
environmental decision-making include the following: stakeholder involvement,
information exchange, holistic approach of the problem, power-sharing, joint
responsibility of successes and failures, and a range of integrated solutions (Randolph
and Bauer 1999, p 174). Of these, incorporating public input has created a paradigm shift
in the way that land and water resources are governed (Cortner and Moote 1994).
The following subsection explores the scholarship that informs the relationship
between public participation and policymaking, starting with the goals and challenges of
public involvement, the institutional mechanisms used to involve the public, and the
planning and policy paradigms that incorporate public input and public participation
mechanisms.
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B1. Public Involvement: Goals and Challenges
Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker (2011) reveal the importance of face-to-face interaction
for governing common-pool resources, and many other scholars have discussed reasons
to involve the public in the policymaking process. Beierle (1999, p 75) argues that one of
the primary motives for involving the public is to meet several “social goals” in planning
and policymaking, including educating the public, incorporating public values in policy,
making better policy decisions, creating trust in institutions, reducing conflict, and
making cost-effective decisions. Literature on public involvement repeatedly discusses
social goals, and each are reviewed here in more detail. This study’s analysis of public
participation in Georgia examines many of these social goals.
Involving the public in the policymaking process creates educational
opportunities through two-way information transfer between policymakers and the public
(Beierle 1999, p 75; Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller 2000, p 352; Irvin and Stansbury
2004, p 56). Without this communication, some members of the public may not
understand the reasons (economic, environmental, scientific, etc.) for particular policy
options. Education influences the public, giving policymakers an opportunity to persuade
them about a policy option (Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller 2000, p 352; Irvin and
Stansbury 2004, p 56).
Beierle (1999, p 75) discusses how public input allows policymakers to include
“public values, assumptions, and preferences into decision making.” In voicing their
opinion, citizens educate policymakers (i.e., present information to policymakers), and
persuade policymakers (Adams 2004, p 43; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 56). The public
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can provide alternative solutions and different interests (Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller
2000, p 352; Connick and Innes 2001, p 10; West 2004, p 66). Additionally, including
the public allows policymakers to gauge public opinion (Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller
2000, p 352).
Making better policy decisions is also a goal of public involvement (Beierle
1999). In theory, involving the public will produce better policy since they will have a
hand in creating the new rules that will later affect them. Therefore, some scholars argue
that including the public helps policymakers create better policies and plans (Connick and
Innes 2001; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 56).
Creating trust in institutions is another social goal associated with public
involvement in policymaking (Beierle 1999). Inclusion of the public in the policymaking
process can build trust and alliances between policymakers and stakeholders (Connick
and Innes 2001, p 10; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 56). Additionally, involving the public
can also reduce conflict and gridlock in decision-making (Beierle 1999; Connick and
Innes 2001, p 10; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 56)
Involving the public also establishes legitimacy in the policymaking process and
fosters social and political capital (Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller 2000, p 352; Connick
and Innes 2001, p 9; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 56; Sabatier et al. 2005). In other
words, public involvement in the policymaking process can encourage cooperation
among participants and allows participants to work together to find and agree on
actionable solutions to problems (i.e., collective action). Overall, collaborative
arrangements establish exchanges of information and feedback between actors, which
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enables the policymaking process to proceed more efficiently and cost-effectively
(Connick and Innes 2001, p 9).
Meeting social goals is the ideal for public participation, but achieving these
objectives is not always feasible (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Some of the issues that
arise when stakeholders are involved in the policymaking process include the amount of
time needed to involve many different actors, the resources (i.e., funding, staff) required
to facilitate collaboration, and the difficulty in trying to find stakeholders who are willing
to commit to the process (Duram and Brown 1999, p 456; Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p
58). The motivations for participants’ involvement varies, which also makes the process
difficult because they have different expectations for what the process will involve
(Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002; Laurian 2004).
Another issue in engaging the public is that they need to understand the function
they play in the process in order for them to have a meaningful experience (for example,
citizens can be asked to comment at public hearings or be involved in collaborating on
committees) (Vari and Kisgyorgy 1998, p 236). Thus, policymakers need to make the
public’s role in the process clear so that participants know how they can affect the
outcome. In addition to problems with policymakers not making the public’s role clear,
they sometimes ignore the public’s views (Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p 58). However,
the process is not collaborative if the public is ignored.
Inclusion can present additional problems if members of the public have polarized
views. Opposing members of the public can greatly manipulate the policymaking
process, resulting in ineffective policies and plans difficult to implement (Irvin and
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Stansbury 2004, p 58). Also, allowing the public to participate in the process could also
create further opposition instead of fostering trust and alliances (Irvin and Stansbury
2004, p 58). For example, a situation could arise where participants with differing
opinions cannot find common ground, resulting in a stalemate where policy problems are
not addressed (Sabatier et al. 2005). Sometimes, the different parties involved cannot
agree on an outcome (Harper, Thomas, and Stein 2005, p 163; Irvin and Stansbury 2004).
In particular, public participation can be challenging when using consensus-based
approaches: the “push toward similarity and agreement generates procedures where
conflict and difference can be lost” (Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006, p 758). Conflict
and differences in opinion are sometimes inevitable. In cases when agreement on an
outcome is difficult or unlikely, Harper, Thomas, and Stein (2005, p 164) argue that
planning processes must try to be just, fair, and avoid “authoritarian planning.”
Members of the public are only effective participants if there is an understanding
about the goals of the policymaking process and the problems that must be addressed
(Vari and Kisgyorgy 1998, p 236). Public participants must be informed in such a way
that they can consider and weigh different options (Abelson et al. 2003). Thus, the public
needs to know how the policymaking process will unfold and how potential outcomes
may affect them (Vari and Kisgyorgy 1998, p 236).
As this section shows, social goals that can be met by including public input in the
policymaking process. However, there are also challenges and conflicts involved with
public participation. Therefore, there needs to be structure in the way that public input
and involvement is incorporated in the policymaking process to avoid, or at least
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minimize, the potential conflicts that can occur. Different institutional mechanisms can
structure public input, and the following subsection includes a discussion of several of
them.

B2. Institutional Mechanisms for Public Involvement
Public input is integral to viable policymaking, despite its challenges, and there
are several ways to engage the public throughout the process. Agencies are trying to get
away from the “traditional decide-announce-defend approach” and instead focus on “codetermining” decisions with participants (Hamilton and Wills-Toker 2006, p 755).
Federal laws such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and NEPA, and similar
acts at the state level create opportunities for the public to participate in the policymaking
process (Dobson and Bell 2006). Incorporating the public in the policymaking process
can take place through several avenues, including public comment periods, stakeholder
partnerships, advisory committees, public hearings, and negotiated rulemaking (Fiorino
1990; Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002, p 646-647). As will be revealed in Section VI,
Georgia employed only public commenting periods, public hearings, and to some extent
– advisory committees; however, a full explanation of the possible mechanisms reveals
their strengths and critiques, as well as their appropriate contextual use.
Federal and state agencies often utilize notice and comment periods to give the
public opportunities to submit statements about new rules (Golden 1998). While
commenting periods allow anyone to comment on new rules, one concern is that “little to
no deliberation among stakeholders takes place with these mechanisms, and input is
rarely binding on decision-makers” (Beierle 1999, p 90). Another concern is that
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business interests tend to be the predominant commenters and there does not seem to be a
reason why agencies listen to some comments over others (Golden 1998). There is no
obvious way for commenters to know how and why agencies weight comments.
Similar to public commenting, public hearings (meetings) allow stakeholders and
the public to voice concerns to policymakers (Fiorino 1990; Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier
2002). While these meetings allow policymakers to hear directly and in-person from the
public, some criticize meetings as “useless democratic rituals that lack deliberative
qualities and fail to give citizens a voice in the policy process” (Adams 2004, p 43).
Despite this criticism, there is evidence to suggest that these meetings at least facilitate
policy agenda-setting and provide information to policymakers (Adams 2004; Kingdon
2011). In addition, Chess and Purcell (1999) found that the majority of studies on public
meetings showed that the meetings affected decision-making. Some factors that affect
public meetings’ effectiveness include inadequate outreach to possible public
participants, poor timing for involvement [which can include waiting until late into the
process to include the public or allowing public to participate after decisions were made],
and the lack of technical information provided (Chess and Purcell 1999).
Advisory committees are a more enduring public input mechanism, and they form
to address a particular project overseen by a public agency (Chess and Purcell 1999).
Any stage of the policy process can utilize advisory committees, depending on the
governing agency’s goals (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002, 647). While these
committees are supposed to “encourage extensive interaction,” scholars have had mixed
reviews of their efficacy in communicating public thought. This is because agencies can

17

limit the influence that advisory committees wield (Chess and Purcell 1999, p 2689), and
choose the participant composition (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002). In Georgia, the
councils acted as advisory committees in many ways, and the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, or Speaker of the House appointed their members (State Water Plan 2011).
Negotiated rulemaking is even more selective, allowing a governing agency to
solicit advice from hand-picked stakeholders (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002, p 647).
The agency involved will form a committee intended to “reach a consensus on a proposed
rule” and the proceedings can take around two and a half years to complete (Coglianese
1997, p 1267). Negotiated rulemaking attempts to decrease the time needed to make new
rules and decrease the number of legal challenges to the new rules; however, these
decreases are no more likely with negotiated rulemaking than with other institutional
mechanisms (Coglianese 1997).
Lastly, stakeholder partnerships involve individuals who form a group to discuss a
policy issue (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002). One of the main differences between
stakeholder partnerships and other institutional mechanisms is that partnerships can be
used throughout the entire policymaking process (from problem identification to policy
implementation). As with some of the other participatory approaches, one of the issues
that arises in stakeholder partnerships is that public participants and technical experts
have trouble communicating complex, technical problems (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier
2002). While possible to differentiate “stakeholder partnership” from other participatory
mechanisms, there are elements of these partnerships that echo dialogical planning and
polycentric governance (Harper, Thomas, and Stein 2005; Ostrom 2009b). In particular,
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stakeholder partnerships include interests at different levels of governance (polycentric
governance) that interact, learn, and build consensus over time (dialogical planning). See
Table 2 for a comparison of these mechanisms.
Table 2: Comparison of Institutional Mechanisms for Public Involvement
Mechanism
Notice and Comment
Periods

Benefits
Give the public opportunities to
submit statements about new
rules

Public
hearings/meetings

Allow policymakers to hear
directly and in-person from the
public
Comments at meetings can help
set agenda
Provides an opportunity for
stakeholders to be a part of
decision-making
Allows interaction between
agencies and stakeholders
Allows a governing agency to
solicit advice from hand-picked
stakeholders
Stakeholders involved in
rulemaking
Involve individuals who form a
group to discuss a policy issue
Partnerships can be used
throughout the entire
policymaking process

Advisory committees

Negotiated
rulemaking

Stakeholder
partnership

Problems
No deliberation among public
or public and decisionmakers
Policymakers not beholden to
comments
Meetings not deliberative for
citizens
Policymakers can ignore
comments
Agencies can limit
committees’ influence
Agency chooses committee
members
Process can take a long time

Trouble communicating
about complex, technical
problems

There are benefits and drawbacks when using any particular mechanism for
public input. And, in studying public meetings, workshops, and citizen advisory
committees, Chess and Purcell (1999) found that no particular mechanism is better than
any other in determining the success of the participatory process or process outcomes.
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Scholars have argued that institutions need to be designed in ways that provide
the public the opportunity for effective participation (Adams 2004, p 44). Some scholars
have argued that the public participation needs to be a part of building social capital
(Durham and Brown 1999; Sabatier et al. 2005). As Durham and Brown (1999, p 466)
argue, “Although regulations increasingly mandate the inclusion of public participation in
natural resource management, there is a distinction between forced minimal inclusion and
proactive beneficial inclusion of the general public.” The idea of the “democratic right”
to participation has proliferated regulatory and policy processes, but the idea of social
capital-building has largely been lost (Rydin and Pennington 2000). In other words, there
has been focus on giving the public opportunities to participate, but the purpose of the
participation [for example, meeting social goals (Beierle 1999)] has largely been
forgotten.

B3. Participatory Arrangements and Models
Models and approaches for including the public in policymaking have been
introduced over the years to respond to the criticism over the lack of public participation.
At times, these participatory approaches utilize mechanisms for public input (such as
public commenting periods), but overall, these approaches try to better accomplish social
goals such as educating the public and reducing conflict in the policymaking process
(Beierle 1999). While this study will not review all of these models, a few are discussed
in this subsection, including the environmental planning process, modular environmental
regulation (MER), polycentric governance, and collaborative watershed management.
This study examines these participatory arrangements because Georgia’s water planning
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process contains many elements of these models, while also taking a unique shape of its
own. The models provide context for the way the state approached participatory water
planning. A discussion of the applicable components of the participatory models shows
their relevance to the state’s water planning and policymaking process.
The environmental planning process is a combination of the rationalcomprehensive planning approach and the participatory approach (Randolph 2004, p 18).
In other words, environmental planning combines the steps of the planning process with
heavy stakeholder participation (Randolph 2004, p 18-19). Georgia’s State Water Plan,
which was the impetus for the ten regional plans in the state, intended for “local and
regional perspectives” to inform the process and plans (State Water Plan 2011). Thus,
Georgia’s regional water planning is a type of environmental planning.
In addition, Georgia’s regional water plan shares many of the same characteristics
of modular environmental regulation (MER). MER includes coordinating different
agencies across all levels of government with stakeholders and other affected parties
(Freeman and Farber 2005). MER’s purpose is to facilitate a consensus-based approach
to solving problems among existing agencies, and Georgia intended for their process to
be “consensus-based” (GA EPD 2009, p 5). The collaborative process also means that
there are several avenues provided for stakeholder participation. MER provides a
“diversity of roles” through which the public is involved in the process, allowing
participants to both generate new policies and maintain accountability in the process
(Freeman and Farber 2005, p 894).
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MER views the geographic area of concern as a “problem-shed,” which is similar
to Georgia’s problem-based approach to water planning (Freeman and Farber 2005). In
addition, MER promotes information-sharing among agencies in order to create
transparency about the process (Freeman and Farber 2005). Lastly, MER allows
adaptability in the process to incorporate new information into decision-making (Freeman
and Farber 2005).
While some scholars have heralded MER as a way to deal with complex and
divisive environmental governance issues (for example, see Innes et al. 2006), the
approach is fallible in the following self-acknowledged ways. Agencies can be resistant
to sharing information and providing the resources necessary for the process (Freeman
and Farber 2005). Also, agencies have narrow foci because of the legislation that grants
them authority; this causes difficulty in acting within a collaborative process where the
rules of the game are not as clearly defined. In addition, agencies do not always want to
include stakeholders in the planning process because of the time and resources needed to
collaborate among all participants (Irvin and Stansbury 2004).
In contrast to MER, polycentric governance is an approach that allows actors at
the local, regional, and national levels to address collective action problems (Ostrom
2009b). Polycentric governance depends upon the relationships of multiple levels of
government; it introduces hierarchy, which is theoretically absent with MER (Andersson
and Ostrom 2008, p 73). In other words, polycentric governance addresses
environmental problems via nested sets of political actors rather than co-equal actors
(Andersson and Ostrom 2008, p 73). The “nestedness” of institutions means that if one
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level of government is unable to address a problem effectively, another level can deal
with aspects that the others cannot (Andersson and Ostrom 2008, p 76). In addition,
polycentric governance allows stakeholders to “adjust their own rules over time, thus
increasing the likelihood of these rules being effective in regulating resource use”
(Andersson and Ostrom 2008, p 78). Polycentric governance applies to Georgia’s water
planning process because different levels of government (state, regional, local) are a part
in implementing the new rules. Also, councils create rules for their own regions instead
of having the state create a “one-size-fits-all” approach.
MER and polycentric governance, in many ways, are competing policy models.
While different levels of government work together to find solutions through MER,
polycentric governance relies more on decentralized decision-making (i.e., in polycentric
governance, each level of government makes their own decisions). MER is a
policymaking process that is centralized in that different levels of government come
together to find solutions to policy problems. In addition, MER suffers from deciding
who should enforce rules while polycentric governance relies on hierarchical
enforcement from different levels of government.
While MER, polycentric governance, and environmental planning can inform the
way we view Georgia’s water planning process, the state’s approach does not fully
adhere to any of these models. However, this section discusses these approaches to show
how institutional structures can foster or impede the public’s involvement in
policymaking and planning. The elements of these approaches that apply to Georgia also
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reveal the institutional constraints and opportunities that the state may have encountered
during the water policymaking process.
Although MER, polycentric governance, and environmental planning apply to
Georgia to some extent, a more appropriate description of the state’s process is a
collaborative approach to watershed management. This study utilizes Sabatier et al.’s
(2005) collaborative watershed management model to outline a broad theoretical
framework for Georgia. The next section discusses details of this model.
Because Georgia is attempting to integrate local and regional perspectives into
governing the state’s water resources, the degree to which the public’s perspectives were
a part of Georgia’s water policymaking is the focus of this dissertation. But, public
participation does not occur in a vacuum – as Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan (2007, p 2)
argue, “it is naïve to suggest that deliberative processes themselves are not subject to
power relationships that shape the way in which they work.” Following this thinking,
this study examines “how institutional norms and rules enabled or constrained
participation” (Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007, p 2).
Overall, this study argues that the process and extent to which the public
participates in rule-making and governance relies heavily on actions, choices, and
omissions in the institutional policy-making and planning paradigms. If the institutions
that structure process rules do not integrate social goals into public participation and do
not seek a process that is truly collaborative (i.e., processes are facilitated where input is
not valued and is simply something to be checked off a list), then the public will not have
a meaningful role in policymaking. As exemplified in this section, there are many
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different inclusionary forums and models for the public; however, the way the public
should be included is contingent on the situational context. Thus, in the next section, a
model that builds on the previous bodies of literature shows how participation ideally
occurs in state water planning, using the Georgia process for contextual application.

III.

Theoretical Model
As Mathis (1999) argues, environmental problems like water scarcity require

integrating several disciplines for decision-making (sociological, economic, ecological,
etc.). Both this model and this study draw on planning, political science, and policy
studies to synthesize current scholarship that both informs public participation practices
and watershed management more generally. While the literature review provided a
broader understanding of public participation and participatory institutions as applied and
compared to Georgia, the model-building in this section expands upon it by focusing and
integrating scholarship that applies to Georgia’s entire water planning process.
The model developed here provides a holistic view of how the entire process took
place, but this study focuses on public participation in Georgia’s regional water planwriting. Thus, the model as a whole provides context for the area of focus (the public
participation during the plan-writing) while also providing a template for future
investigations of the model’s other variables (i.e., future studies can focus on the
implementation of the regional water plans, which is modeled here to understand how the
plan-writing stage leads to water plan establishment and then, implementation). The
variables and actions leading to the regional plan-writing had structural and institutional
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influences on the ways the water plans developed, so understanding the process
comprehensively provides context for the study. This research relies on the assumption
that the public attempted to influence the regional plan-writing and that the structure and
process of regional plan-writing also influenced the public participation from these
networks. Therefore, testing this relationship will reveal the institutions, politics, and
rules that facilitated or hindered public participation.
To start the model-building, Sabatier et al.’s (2005) collaborative watershed
management model outlines a broader theoretical framework (see Figure 1). Sabatier et
al.’s framework provides an overview of the variables that influence collaborative
watershed arrangements, but the approach requires further theoretical underpinning to
establish causal variables (Sabatier et al. 2005, p 173). Thus, Sabatier et al. (2005, p 174)
suggest using other theories to further examine collaborative watershed arrangements. In
this study, many of the causal relationships will be established using variables that
Margerum (2011) identifies, as well as aspects of Ostrom’s (1999) institutional analysis
and development framework as applied by Margerum (2011).
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Figure 1: Collaborative Watershed Management Model (Sabatier et al. 2005)

A. Collaborative and Network Definitions
This subsection explains and defines several ideas before discussing the model
proposed in this study. Margerum (2011, p 6) argues that collaboration is “an approach
to solving complex problems in which a diverse group of autonomous stakeholders
deliberates to build consensus and develop networks for translating consensus into
results.” Thus, a collaborative is the actual group trying to build consensus and to achieve
results (i.e., “the core stakeholder group”) (Margerum 2011, p 33).
However, collaboratives operate at different levels, which will complicate
Sabatier et al.’s framework. Just as Ostrom (1990, 1999) suggests examining three
different levels of rules (constitutional-choice rules, collective-choice rules, and
operational rules) in the Institutional Analysis and Development framework,
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Margerum(2011, p 23) uses these concepts to create a typology of collaborative groups.
Policy collaboratives operate at the constitutional-choice level of rules, organizational
collaboratives act at the collective choice-level of rules, and action collaboratives deal
with the operational rules (Margerum 2011, p 24). Distinguished from MER, in which
participants from different collaborative groups work on a problem together, this
collaborative approach is similar to polycentric governance because there is institutional
nestedness (Ostrom 2009b).
While the collaborative group typologies help explain “the core stakeholder
group” involved in the policymaking, Margerum also introduces a typology of networks
since “collaboratives often have to influence a broader set of decision makers” (2011, p
33). The types of networks include social, interorganizational, and political networks
(Margerum 2011, p 33-35). Margerum defines social networks as “interpersonal
networks” (2011, p 181), interorganizational networks as “formal and informal networks
created across organizations to sustain ongoing relationships” (2011, p 207), and political
networks are “a set of individuals who occupy political and policy positions along with
their sustained relationships with other position holders” (2011, p 235).
These network types interact with action, organizational, and policy
collaboratives in different ways. However, the tendency is for policy collaboratives to
use political networks, for organizational collaboratives to use interorganizational
networks, and for social networks to use action networks (Margerum 2011, p 39-40).
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B. Proposed Model
The model proposed in this study is included in Figure 2. The variables will each
be explained in more detail throughout the study. Arrows in the model represent
processes and relationships while the rectangles represent established conditions,
institutions, policies, plans, and outcomes.
Figure 2: Water Planning Process Evaluation Framework*

*The focus for this study is the relationship between the social, interorganizational, and
political networks variable (specifically, participants deemed “the public” in the planning
process) and the regional plan-writing variable. However, the entire planning process is
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modeled here to provide context and institutional factors influencing the variables of
interest.
C. Context Variable
The model for water planning collaboratives utilizes the explanations for
collaboratives and networks. Margerum (2011) describes several factors that contribute
to the reasons collaboratives form and convene: resource attributes, institutions,
community characteristics, and stakeholders’ willingness to participate. Similarly,
Sabatier et al.’s framework also begins with the assumption that government institutions,
as well as different socioeconomic, ecological, and civic community conditions facilitate
the collaborative watershed management’s creation and chances of successful execution
(2005, p 14). Beierle and Cayford’s (2002) conceptual model for public participation
also beings with a context variable. This study’s model uses the context variable from
the collaborative watershed model by Sabatier et al. (2005) because it provides
background for factors such as Georgia’s economy, the state’s government structure, the
environmental conditions in the region, and the different political, interorganizational,
and social networks in the state (Margerum 2011). This variable does not advocate
causality; instead, the context variable identifies what currently exists in the state.

D. Social, Interorganizational, and Political Networks
In addition to discussing the characteristics of the social, interorganizational, and
political networks, it is important to note why different interests get involved in the
policymaking and planning process. The literature reveals that there are many different
reasons why individuals and groups choose to participate. In some cases, participants
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may have volunteered, been invited (or targeted), or been forced to participate (Brody
2001; Barnes et al. 2003). For example, Golden (1998) found that business interests
often volunteer comments on new rules since they will be directly impacted by them.
Others may participate because they have been “motivated by collective
experiences of oppression or exclusion” or because of philanthropic motivations (Barnes
et al. 2003, p 380). For example, Samuelson et al.( 2005) found that in watershed
collaboratives, people concerned about the environment and water are more likely to
participate than those who are not as concerned; in addition, people who viewed water
quality as low were more willing to participate (Samuelson et al. 2005). In this case,
environmental views were the motivation. Other factors affecting participation included
sociodemographic characteristics, individual motivations, local social context, and the
level of trust in government agencies (Laurian 2004, p 55). For instance, Laurian (2004,
p 55) found one reason participants choose to get involved is the response to perceived
risks. Often, groups have different goals in the policymaking and planning process,
which increases the complexity involved in creating new rules (Loh 2012).
Some participants will increase or limit their involvement depending on the
“perceived legitimacy of contributions” (Barnes et al. 2003, p 380). Based on how a
person or group perceives their ability contribute, their public involvement can include
participatory responses (voice) and nonparticipatory responses (exit, loyalty, neglect, and
resignation) (Laurian 2004, p 55; Hirschman 1970). Although nonparticipatory responses
occur, Laurian (2004) found that people participated in ways that planners may not have
anticipated [i.e., people may use “voice” in informal avenues instead of the institutional
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mechanisms designed for responses (Margerum 2011)]. For example, some alternative
ways of participation included petitions, talking to local politicians, attending church
meetings, and writing to newspapers (Laurian 2004).
In terms of exit, neglect, and resignation, one of the largest contributions to
nonparticipation was lack of awareness (Hirschman 1970; Laurian 2004). Other reasons
causing nonparticipation included some participants trusting the government to fix the
problem and low-income residents feeling resigned. This response was due, in part, to
the fact they felt participation did not seem possible or that they would have no influence
in the process (Laurian 2004). Thus, their “perceived legitimacy of contribution” was
very low (Barnes et al. 2003, p 380).
While individual motivations are one reason people participated (Laurian 2004),
there are other forces to consider. Barnes et al. (2003, p 380) argue that planners and
policymakers need “to understand the power relations operating within any particular
initiative.” The planners themselves can manipulate power, which causes the planning
process to occur in certain ways – keeping some people’s voices from receiving attention
or being utilized (Forester 1989; Barnes et al. 2003; Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan
2007). And, institutional structuring of the process facilitates or hinders certain the
public from participating in the process.
Overall, there are many different reasons why individuals, groups, and networks
get involved in the policymaking process, and this model recognizes this fact. The
influence of networks is discussed throughout the rest of the model-building.
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E. Agenda-Setting and Visioning Process
From the context variable, the proposed model in this study diverges from the
Sabatier et al. (2005) model’s process variable and instead suggests a visioning process
variable (Loh 2012). This variable represents the process by which different political,
interorganizational, and social networks frame the problem to needing resolution through
policy. Or, to put this variable in the context of the public policy literature, this variable
attempts to answer how this became a perceived problem (Kingdon 2011).
The visioning process can occur publicly, privately, or through a mixture of both
public and private means, but an important aspect of the public process occurrence is
explained by Kaza and Hopkins (2009, p 499): “Participating in a visioning process or
other planning processes in public provides an opportunity for various individuals and
groups to discover others’ attitudes, goals, and preferences.” Whether visioning occurs
publically or privately, the visioning process leads to implications for rules and plans
formed later in the policymaking and planning process (Loh 2012). If the community
does not have a say in the process from the start, the public may not feel their
participation had a meaningful impact on the rulemaking and there may be difficulties
implementing plans after they are developed (Forester 1989; Innes and Booher 2010; Loh
2012).
Building upon the work of Kingdon (2011, p 87) and Loh (2012), this study
argues that three streams occur in the visioning process: (1) problem recognition, (2)
formation and refining of policy proposals, and (3) politics. Kingdon posits that policy,
politics, and problem streams meet during a window of opportunity, placing problems on
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the government’s agenda so that policy can address them. Building on this concept, the
model proposed in this study hypothesizes that political networks, interorganizational
networks, and social networks all attempt to influence the visioning process to frame the
problem in ways that will benefit their particular network (Margerum 2011). Thus, to
analyze how water planning arrived on Georgia’s agenda in 2001, the different streams
that preceded water policy change in the state are discussed in the following subsection.

E1. Problem Stream (Kingdon 2011)
In 2000, before Georgia introduced legislation for metro Atlanta and the rest of
the state, policymakers and planners needed to address many water resource-related
problems. Drought was the predominant problem. The entire state faced drought, which
started in 1998, and extended throughout the state for 4 years, ending in 2002 (Palmer,
Kutzing, and Steinemann 2002; Stooksbury 2008). In 2000, during the midst of the
drought, the GA EPD restricted outdoor watering in metro Atlanta and planned to restrict
watering throughout the rest of the state (Shelton 2000, p 1A). These restrictions were
the first time GA EPD ever implemented watering limits (Shelton 2000, p 1A).
The drought also caused groundwater wells in the southern part of the state to
reach record low levels (Seabrook 2000c, p 1B). Wells for rural households went dry,
and farmers planted seeds in dust (Seabrook 2000c, p 1B). Lake levels for Lake Lanier
and Lake Allatoona were below normal for several years, and in 2000, flows into Lake
Lanier were half of what they were the year before (Seabrook 2000c, p 1B). In addition,
as many as 45,000 acres of forested area burned because of the dry conditions in the state
(Seabrook 2000c, p 1B).
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In addition to the drought, Georgia confronted continued fights with Florida and
Alabama on how to share the water in two river basins (Staff 2000, p 4C). In 2000,
Florida and Alabama were threatening Georgia with lawsuits if the state was not able to
limit its consumption of the river water the states shared (Firestone 2000, p 7A). The
main reason the states were in conflict was the Chattahoochee River, which runs through
all three states and is the main source of water for the Atlanta area. As one newspaper
article stated, “It was Atlanta's growth that sparked the water war” (Copeland 2001, p
3A).
While Atlanta was the main reason for Georgia’s problems with Alabama and
Florida, the metro area faced several other problems. The first of these challenges was a
“water quality crisis” (Seabrook 2000a, p 1B). Metro Atlanta faced a federal court order
to limit discharges because of polluted rivers and streams (Staff 2000, p 4C). The threat
of limiting discharges was also a threat to economic activity as businesses would need to
curb activity to decrease pollution (Staff 2000, p 4C). The water quality issues in Atlanta
were feared to “"jeopardize the region's economic prosperity and residents' quality of
life” (Seabrook 2000a, p 1B).
Atlanta also experienced rapid and prolific population growth, which was one of
the biggest tests for Atlanta’s water supply (Firestone 2000, p 7A). Overall, inadequate
water quality and supply were both concerns for metro Atlanta, and the problems were
possible threats to economic growth in the area (Wooten 2001, p 20A).
While Atlanta confronted water challenges of its own, other parts of the state
faced water issues of their own. Groundwater aquifers drained along the coast, resulting
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in the threat of saltwater intrusion (Staff 2000, p 4C). Saltwater intrusion also threatened
freshwater marshes that were wildlife habitats (Staff 2000, p 4C). In rural areas, animal
waste from farming activities was contaminating drinking water (Staff 2000, p 4C).
Also, agricultural water use was overextending water resources in the Flint River basin
(Editorial 2001, p 10A).
E2. Policy Stream (Kingdon 2011)
As these problems gained attention, discussions of possible policies started taking
place. In addition, the influence of and framing by interorganizational networks (and in
some cases, social networks) can be seen in this stream. In Atlanta, the Metro Atlanta
Chamber of Commerce and the Regional Business Coalition formed a Clean Water
Initiative Task Force (an interorganizational network) to study water quality in the metro
area (Pruitt 2000, p 3B; Seabrook 2000a, p 1B). In 2001, the Task Force hoped Governor
Barnes would propose legislation based on the recommendations from the water quality
study (Pruitt 2000, p 3B).
Additionally, a group called Research Atlanta (an interorganizational network)
conducted a study with recommendations that included creating a water plan for the
entire state (Seabrook 2000e, p 1E). A professor from University of Georgia, Jim
Kundell, led the study for Research Atlanta (Seabrook 2000e, p 1E). Kundell said the
group examined water management in all 50 states to come up with lessons learned for
Georgia (Seabrook 2000e, p 1E). Despite Research Atlanta’s recommendations, the
creation of a comprehensive plan for the entire state during the 2001 General Assembly
session was doubtful (Seabrook 2000e, p 1E). However, conversations about forming
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committees to set guidelines for a state-wide plan took place during this time (Seabrook
2000e, p 1E).
In addition, discussions occurred for a state water bill of rights. The bill of rights
intended to outline principles for water policy creation for the state (Seabrook 2000b, p
4C). Many groups created the bill of rights (“more than 60 conservation, scientific,
academic, industrial and government groups” - a combination of social and
interorganizational networks) and hoped the bill would be adopted by the General
Assembly in the 2001 session (Seabrook 2000b, p 4C).
Officials also noted a lack of comprehensive water policy during this time (Staff
2000, p 4C). The legislation adopted in Georgia through 2000 was a patchwork of policy
instead of comprehensive plans (Staff 2000, p 4C). For example, Georgia adopted
legislation to pay farmers in South Georgia to stop irrigating land during drought (Staff
2000, p 4C). Critics argued that paying the farmers was a “Band-Aid solution” to statewide water problems, and they argued for comprehensive plans for the state (Staff 2000,
p 4C).
Part of the lack of comprehensive water planning was a dearth of drought policy.
During a drought in 1988, Georgia EPD discussed creating drought management plans
but failed to do so (Seabrook 2000d, p 1A). In the midst of the drought in 2000,
however, EPD Director Harold Reheis promised to create a drought plan in the next year
(Seabrook 2000d, p 1A).
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E3. Politics Stream (Kingdon 2011)
Agrawal (2003) argues that common-pool research needs more historical and
political considerations because solely institutional analyses tend to ignore these factors;
thus, the influence of politics (political networks) is included in this study. While the
state discussed the various water problems and policies, politics were also a driving
factor. Part of the challenge Georgia faced was the many different interests competing
for water in the state (Draper 2001). Water-user collaboration was needed to create
comprehensive plans for future use (Draper 2001).
Collaboration was difficult to accomplish because of the large number of users,
but also because of the political conflicts between Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. In
particular, Metro Atlanta needed cooperation beyond Georgia’s borders since the area’s
water use was the impetus for Georgia’s fight with Alabama and Florida over the
ACF/ACT river basins (Staff 2000, p 4C).
In addition to fights with Alabama and Florida, Atlanta and the rest of the state
had conflicts (some might argue that these are two separate political networks). The idea
of “two Georgias” was an issue in the state for many years, but Governor Barnes hoped
to address the matter when he took office. Barnes came into office in 1999 using the
theme of “One Georgia” to bridge the divide between Atlanta and the rest of the state
(Williams 2001, p B01). Barnes even created the OneGeorgia Authority to attempt to
decrease the disparity between urban and rural areas of the state (Editorial 2001, p 10A).
Despite Barnes’ efforts, water problems in Georgia were “dividing the state into two
camps” (Williams 2001, p B01). Areas outside of Atlanta feared the metro area would
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attempt to create interbasin transfers, resulting in Atlanta taking the water from other
parts of the state (Williams 2001, p B01).
Overall, water problems proved to be a “thorny issue” for Governor Barnes, and
the Clean Water Initiative Task Force’s recommendations for metro Atlanta was a
hopeful path to provide him allies and options as he pushed forward with water initiatives
in the 2001 General Assembly session (Pruitt 2000, p 3B). Barnes intended to confronted
water problems in the 2000 General Assembly session, but instead focused efforts on
education (Pruitt 2000, p 3B).
The sixty groups that drew up the water bill of rights in 2000 hoped their
guidelines would have bearing on water issues in the 2001 General Assembly session as
Governor Barnes pushed for new legislation (Seabrook 2000b, p 4C). In addition, groups
like the Association County Commissioners of Georgia and the Georgia Municipal
Association (which could be considered both interorganizational and political networks)
advocated for comprehensive, state-wide water planning because of their concerns for
"equitable access to a reliable supply of good quality water" (Seabrook 2000e, p 1E).
Overall, the problem, policy, and politics streams as well as interorganizational
and political networks (and to a lesser degree, social networks) played a part in the
visioning process in Georgia. Through these different streams, networks, and actors, the
need for comprehensive water planning in the state was able to get on the agenda. The
next variable will discuss what happened after the political agenda was set.
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F. Constitutional-choice rules (Policy)
After visioning occurs in Loh’s (2012) model, establishing master plan goals
takes place. However, this study’s proposed model introduces additional variables before
plan formation. Using Ostrom’s (1990; 1999) ideas of different levels of rules, this study
argues that constitutional-choice level rules must be established before any plans are
created and even before a policy collaborative (Margerum 2011) is established. These
rules provide structure for the process and establish an institutional design for new rules.
Much like polycentric governance relies on different levels of governance to address
problems, this study argues that different levels of rules provide direction for the
policymaking process (Ostrom 2009b).
In the case of Georgia’s water planning, several years of constitutional-level
policymaking occurred before establishment of a policy collaborative. In 2001, two bills
creating a planning district for Atlanta and a state-wide study committee gained
momentum and passed (Metro Water District 2009; Kundell and Christy 2004). Senate
Bill 130 intended to create a water planning district for metro Atlanta area that would
fashion plans, coordinate between governments, and encourage a regional viewpoint for
water resources (Metro Water District 2009). In contrast, House Resolution 142
established the Joint Comprehensive Water Plan Study Committee and the Water Plan
Advisory Committee, which were to facilitate guidelines to direct future comprehensive
water planning in the rest of the state (Kundell and Christy 2004).
Separate polices were created for Atlanta and the rest of the state because
different types of constitutional-choice level rules were needed for each. For the state, a
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study committee needed to create guidelines for later constitutional-choice rulemaking.
Legislators were not ready to create constitutional-choice rules for state-wide water
planning in 2001. However, the Clean Water Initiative Task Force created guidelines
were in place for Atlanta’s constitutional-level rulemaking, allowing legislators to act on
Atlanta’s water problems in 2001.
The creation of constitutional-level rules occurred for the rest of the state in
subsequent years. Eighteen months after House Resolution 142 was created, working
groups composed of members from the two study committees submitted guidelines to
Georgia’s Governor and General Assembly (Kundell and Christy 2004; State of Georgia
2004). The recommendations from the committees were embodied in House Bill 237,
which was passed to establish comprehensive water management in the state (House Bill
237 2004; Kundell and Christy 2004). With the passing of the Comprehensive Statewide Water Management Planning Act in 2004 (hereafter referred to as the Water
Planning Act), the GA EPD and a newly created Water Council were charged with
creating a state-wide, comprehensive water management plan (Caldwell 2005). The
Water Planning Act gave GA EPD and the Water Council guidance on how to create this
plan (Caldwell 2005).
Overall, the Water Planning Act of 2004 established the constitutional-level rules
that governed the process for creating collective-choice rules. In addition, the Water
Planning Act also created a policy collaborative made up of GA EPD and the Water
Council.
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G. Statewide Policy Collaborative, Plan Writing, and Constitutional-choice rules
(Statewide Plan)
The policy collaborative’s duty was to create an initial state-wide water
management plan – see Figure 2. As previously mentioned, the collaborative was
composed of GA EPD and the newly created Water Council. The Water Council
consisted of several politicians, business leaders, and officials from various Georgia state
agencies (The Water Council 2008a).
Planners played a significant role in writing the statewide plan; thus, the planners
greatly influenced the way the statewide policy collaborative operated. In this case, the
planners were GA EPD and the Water Council members; however, there are questions
about the extent to which GA EPD and the Water Council were truly “planners.” Instead,
they could have been agencies with minimal planning experience (i.e., untrained
planners). Their training in planning is unknown. However, despite their level of
training as planners, GA EPD and the Water Council still held the role of planner because
of the power and role they held in the planning process.
Through the lens of policy literature, the planners served as “policy brokers”
(Sabatier 2005). As Sabatier (2005, p 28) explains in his advocacy coalition framework
(ACF), policy brokers are actors who try “to find some reasonable compromise which
will reduce intense conflict.” However, Georgia’s water policy subsystem is more
complicated than the advocacy coalition framework allows. In Georgia, coalitions do not
coalesce around a few water issues. Instead, there are many different actors and interests
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at stake, which complicates the ACF model. However, the idea of policy brokers can
provide some insight into planners’ roles in the policymaking process.
Understanding how planners view, manipulate, and use power informs an analysis
of the choices made and the way the planning process plays out (Forester 1989; Barnes et
al. 2003; Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007). In many circumstances, the planners
themselves wield the power. For example, planners are able to decide what kind of
information is made available (or not made available) to participants in the process
(Forester 1989, p 28). Two-way flow of information and information-sharing is an
integral part of the planning and policymaking process (Margerum 2011; Brody,
Godschalk, and Burby 2003). Planners can also play a part in providing misinformation,
whether knowingly or not, which can shape the planning process and stakeholder
attitudes about trust and communication (Forester 1989; Beierle 1999; Connick and Innes
2001; Irvin and Stansbury 2004). They are also able to shape participation by deciding
who to contact, who can participate, and who can persuade other participants in the
process (Forester 1989; Brody 2001; Barnes et al. 2003). However, by recognizing these
dynamics, planners can make informed decisions about their role in the process and the
power they are able to utilize with respect to information-sharing, agenda-setting, and
decision-making (Forester 1989).
The idea of bounded rationality can provide insight into how decision-making
occurs in the planning process (Forester 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Bounded
rationality is the idea that a person does not make decisions after weighing the benefits
and costs of different options; instead, a person makes decisions based on limited and
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incomplete information (Forester 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2009). Because people
involved in the policymaking process operate with limited and incomplete information,
bounded rationality acts as a way of establishing routine patterns of thinking during
periods of stability and as a way of creating pressure to act during times of rapid change
(Forester 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2009).
As a result of bounded rationality, information distortion can occur. In some
cases, the source of information distortion is unplanned and inevitable; for example,
random noise or a person’s unique way of communicating can affect information-sharing
(Forester 1989).

However, sometimes the source of distortion is an inevitable

systematic or structural issue (Forester 1989). Overall, the way that distortions occur
helps explain the way that planners are able to manipulate information during the
planning process as a form of power (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003).
Knowing that information is power, planner roles can greatly influence the
planning and policymaking process (Forester 1989; Margerum 2011; Brody, Godschalk,
and Burby 2003). Forester (1989, p 29) establishes several different planner roles: the
technician, the structuralist, the incrementalist (or pragmatist), the liberal-advocate, and
the progressive. Similarly, Margerum (2011) argues the planner can act as a listener,
interpreter, guide, balancer, collaborator, or manager. And, as previously discussed, the
planner is a policy broker because policy brokers are able to influence the way competing
interests interact and influence the policymaking process (Sabatier 2005). By
establishing these roles, the planner’s role and use of power in the planning process can
be better understood.
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In Georgia, understanding the role that policy brokers such as GA EPD and the
Water Council played helps to explain why the policymaking and planning process
occurred as it did. Forester’s and Margerum’s planner roles can help scholars
hypothesize about the outcomes of planning processes. See Figure 3 for a more in-depth
view of the Statewide Policy Collaborative variable.
Figure 3: Further information on the “Statewide Policy Collaborative” variable

While policy brokers were the most influential actors in creating the statewide
water plan, influence from political, interorganizational, and social networks was also a
factor. The Water Council and GA EPD held a series of public meetings to gather input
in 2006 (The Water Council 2006). In addition, the Water Council and GA EPD sought
advice from technical advisory committees, basin advisory committees, and a statewide
advisory committee (Couch 2007). Establishment of the ten planning regions also
occurred during this time. More research, however, is needed to understand to what
extent stakeholder participation and network influence played a part in creating the
statewide water plan and planning regions.
Over the course of several years, GA EPD and the Water Council created a statewide plan, which the Georgia General Assembly adopted in 2008 as the Georgia
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Comprehensive State-wide Water Management Plan (State Water Plan 2011a). The plan
required an assessment of the state’s water resources, forecasts of future demand, and the
creation of regional water plans (State Water Plan 2011a).
In many ways, the state-wide water management plan further refined the
constitutional-choice rules established in the 2004 Water Planning Act. Although the
2004 Water Planning Act created a policy collaborative, the state-wide water
management plan established another set of policy collaboratives to create collective
choice rules (i.e., regional water plans) for water planning regions across the state. See
Figure 2 for these proposed variables.

H. Regional Policy Collaboratives and Plan Writing
The State-wide Water Plan established ten different regions to move forward with
water planning in the state (this process excluded the district associated with metro
Atlanta). To govern this process, councils were created and members appointed by the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Speaker of the House (Georgia’s State Water Plan
2009). Essentially, the councils served as policy collaboratives to create water plans for
their respective regions in the state (Margerum 2011). While the councils share
characteristics of organizational collaboratives, they mostly fit the policy collaborative
typology for the following reasons: they focus on policy; government officials appoint
members; community input focuses on proposed rules; and, the rules it creates affect
organizations (Margerum 2011, p 24-25, 30).
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To assess the way collaboratives convene, Margerum (2011, p 55-56) suggests
examining the supportive context that allows collaboration to occur, the legitimate broker
involved in starting the collaborative, the selection and structuring of stakeholder
participation, and the attractiveness of the forum for convening. In addition, open
communication, conflict management, and public involvement are all a part of this
“supportive context” for collaboration (these aspects will be discussed more throughout
this section). Margerum (2011) calls this approach a “facilitated process” because it
“maximize(s) participation” (p 88). In the case of Georgia’s water planning, several
questions derive from Margerum’s suggestions:
Question 1: What was the context for convening? This study has sought to answer
this question thus far by explaining how Georgia’s water planning process
occurred.
Question 2: Who is the legitimate broker and what is their role? Margerum (2011, p
55) defines the broker as “an individual or organization with legitimacy that helps
initiate a collaborative.” This idea could be integrated with Sabatier’s idea of a
policy broker and in some ways, Forester’s (1989) planner roles. In Georgia’s
case, the Water Council and the GA EPD recommended collaboratives. Through
the state-wide water management plan they created, they outlined the way
regional water planning would occur through these regional policy collaboratives.
Question3: How were stakeholders selected and what was the process for this
selection? This question is discussed in more depth in the rest of this section.
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Question 4: Was there an attractive forum in Georgia for water planning to occur?
Margerum (2011, p 56) explains that attractive forums exist when there is a
mandate that requires the collaborative to convene, when stakeholders feel that
benefits are greater than transaction costs, and when benefits of participating are
equal to contributing to the process. To answer this question, more research is
needed on Georgia’s regional plan writing process.
In addition to analyzing the way the policy collaboratives convene, Margerum also
argues that scholars need to analyze the way stakeholders were included in the process.
In terms of the model proposed in this study, this would mean examining stakeholder
roles in the policy collaborative itself, as well as stakeholder roles in the regional plan
writing.
In Georgia, each council had to seek public input throughout the planning process
(GA EPD 2009). In addition, each region constructed public participation plans.
Margerum’s criteria for stakeholder selection and structuring (2011, p 67) provide the
following factors to analyze in regional water planning: (1) stakeholder selection, (2)
stakeholder experience, and (3) public experience.

H1. Stakeholder Selection and Structuring
Margerum (2011, p 67) discusses the importance of facilitating a participation
process that is “perceived as fair;” fairness includes factors such as transparency,
opportunity, inclusiveness, appropriate forums, and fitting span of public viewpoints
(Margerum 2011, p 67-81). In Georgia, questions remain about how the process for
council member appointment occurred. To determine if social, interorganizational, and
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political networks were able to effectively influence the makeup of the councils, further
analysis needs to occur. This study hypothesizes that networks attempted to influence the
composition of the regional policy collaboratives (see Figure 2), and in turn, the makeup
of the councils influenced the way that networks continued to play a part in the water
planning process. For example, if an interorganizational network was not able to gain
representation in the council, then perhaps their strategy was to influence the regional
plan writing process instead. Thus, some of the determining factors needing examination
are whether the council selection process was insulated from politics and whether or not
stakeholder selection was inclusive (Margerum 2011, p 68-69).
There are six elements of public participation that the council had to choose
during the planning process: (1) Administration, (2) Objectives, (3) Stage, (4) Targeting,
(5) Techniques, and (6) Information (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003, p 246).
Administration involves the decision to make a participation plan and how the use of staff
to implement the plan. Objectives include the ways the public will be involved (for
example, deciding if the public will be allowed to influence the process, give their
opinion, or just be educated about the process). Stage addresses the timing of stakeholder
involvement. Targeting involves deciding which citizen groups to involve. Techniques
include the different kinds of ways of participation (for example, public meetings, public
comments, etc). Lastly, planners must decide the types of information provided and how
to communicate that information to stakeholders. Overall, all of these elements
influenced the way stakeholder selection and structuring occurred as Georgia created
regional plans.
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H2. Stakeholder Experience
In addition to how stakeholders were included, analyzing the way stakeholders
were able to contribute to the plan-writing is also an important factor to investigate.
Factors can include organization of stakeholder input, the substance and fairness of
deliberations, and the ways participants related to other stakeholders (Margerum 2011, p
70, 79-80). Additional factors to consider include communication among stakeholders,
the handling of disputes, and the ways to seek consensus (Margerum 2011, p 90-91).
In assessing consensus-building, there is also a need to analyze the facilitator who
led the process (Margerum 2011, p 91). In Georgia’s case, it is difficult to know who fit
this description. Ultimately, the entity that oversaw the water planning process was GA
EPD, but the councils also directed the work in their specific regions. In addition, the
councils each hired consultants to help facilitate the process, which raises the question of
whether the consultants were the facilitators. Without a clearly defined facilitator, there
may be problems in creating a legitimately collaborative process. See Figure 4 for the
“Regional Policy Collaboratives” variable.
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Figure 4: Further information on the “Regional Policy Collaboratives” variable.

H3. Public Experience
As Smith, Nell, and Prystupa (1997, p 144) argue, “The ability of special interest
groups to adequately represent ‘the public interest’ has been seriously questioned.
Frequently, interest groups are speaking for a much smaller segment of the public than
they care to admit.” Thus, including the public is an important factor in the planning
process since stakeholder groups only represent small segments of the population at
times. As Margerum (2011, p 109) argues, involving the public at-large is important for
a plan’s legitimacy in a community. For this study, the planning process is examined to
see if (at all) the public at-large was included; in addition, the process was analyzed to
see if public inclusion was differentiated from stakeholder participation.
To understand how Georgia’s plans emerged as negotiated agreements to govern
water, this study examines several elements of the regional water plan writing process:
the role of planners, stakeholder selection and structuring, the stakeholder experience,
and the public experience. To examine plan-writing, issues analyzed include
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information-sharing, politics, and constraints or facilitations of institutions. Ideally, social
learning occurs as policy-writing occurs; however, the process requires “provision of
sufficient time, involving stakeholders early, and careful attention to process
management” for social learning to occur (Tippett, Searle, Pahl-Wostl, and Rees 2005, p
287). While models like MER focus on the stakeholder/public experience and
information-sharing and polycentric governance focuses on institutions and their role in
governance, the model proposed in this study attempts to show how watershed councils –
and Georgia in particular – can structure both the plan-writing process and policy
collaboratives for rulemaking.
I. Collective-Choice Rules (Plans)
GA EPD finalized and adopted Georgia’s regional water plans in November 2011
(Georgia’s State Water Plan 2009). These plans now act as the collective-choice rules in
the state to govern water resources. To examine the overall water planning across the
state, an evaluation of each regional plan can occur to see how regions followed rules that
governed the planning process. Thus, plan quality is a proxy to evaluate the
policymaking and planning process as a whole. As Brody (2003a) argues, “Plan quality
is increasingly being used both as an outcome variable for assessing the planning process
and as a causal variable for assessing the plan implementation process” (p 193).
To evaluate each plan, a plan-quality evaluation protocol must be developed
(Berke et al. 2006, p 78). While the use of most plan-quality evaluation protocols is to
analyze land use planning, scholars can develop a protocol using similar characteristics to
analyze water planning.
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Berke et al. (2009, p 70) present “two key conceptual dimensions” regarding plan
evaluation: the first is an analysis of “the content and format of key components of the
plan.” This is also known as internal plan quality. The second key conceptual dimension
is “the relevance of the scope and coverage of the plan in fitting the local situation”
(Berke et al. 2009, p 70). This is also known as external plan quality.
The protocol must evaluate internal plan quality characteristics such as issue
identification and vision, goals, fact base, policies, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation, and internal consistency (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231). The external
plan quality characteristics to evaluate include organization and presentation,
interorganizational coordination, and compliance (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231).
Development of a water plan protocol needs to occur before applying it to
Georgia. Some of the internal plan quality elements to analyze may include problem
identification, water plan vision and goals, the fact base (resource assessments, technical
documents, etc.), water policies directed at specific uses, ways to implement water
policies, ways of monitoring and evaluating watershed changes, and an evaluation of the
plans’ internal consistency (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231). For an analysis of
external water plan quality, elements such as compliance with plan mandates,
coordination with existing policies, and the “understandability” of the plan must all be
examined (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231). Plan mandate compliance needs
examination because scholars have found that without mandates, local governments will
often ignore risks and avoid creating regulations that limit user behavior (Burby and
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Dalton 1994, p 229). This is particularly important because mandates help improve plan
quality but may not realize the ultimate plan goal (in implementation) (Norton 2005).
In addition to analyzing plan quality in and of itself, stakeholder influence on plan
quality is also worth examining. On a study on hazard plan quality in Florida and
Washington, Brody (2003a, p 197) found that “citizen participation in the planning
process leading to 1999 plans has a positive but statistically nonsignificant effect on 1999
hazards plan quality.” However, Brody (2003a) also found that in Washington, citizen
participation was the “strongest predictor of plan quality and policy change compared to
all other variables in the model” (Brody 2003a, p 197).
In another study, Brody (2003b) tested the relationship between management plan
quality and stakeholder participation. He argued that even though scholars, planners, and
policymakers have claimed stakeholder participation results in better plans, no one had
tested that relationship (Brody 2003b, p 408). Consequently, he tested it, relying on two
hypotheses. The first hypothesis was, “The representation of key stakeholders in the
planning process will result in a higher quality plan (breadth)” (Brody 2003b, p 410).
The second hypothesis stated, “The participation of specific stakeholders, such as
industry, government, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), will result in a higher
quality plan (activity)” (Brody 2003b, p 410). Brody (2003b, p 412) found that there is no
statistically significant influence on plan quality when a broad spectrum of stakeholders
participated. However, Brody (2003b, p 413) did find that having certain stakeholders
participate resulted in better plan quality. In particular, he found that resource-based
industry and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had a statistically significant
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positive effect on plan quality (Brody 2003b, p 415). This relates – to some degree – to
Golden’s (1998) findings that business interests’ tended to comment the most; however,
her findings did not indicate whether the business comments had better or worse effects.
Building upon Brody’s (2003a, b) work, scholars can examine the way
stakeholder participation affects plan quality. In Georgia in particular, scholars can
develop a water plan protocol using Brody’s (2003b) ecosystem management plan
protocol. Surveys can measure stakeholder influence and then the analysis can compare
survey responses to plan quality. See Figure 2 for more details about the “Collectivechoice rules (Regional Plans)” variable.

J. Regional Plan Implementation and Watershed Outcomes
While evaluating Georgia’s water plans is one way of examining the outcome of
the water planning process, analyzing the implementation of the plans is also a way to
measure the effectiveness of the planning process (Brody 2003a; Laurian et al. 2004;
Norton 2005; Deyle, Chapin, and Baker 2008). In addition to watershed outcomes,
scholars can examine the relationships resulting from the policymaking process
(relationships among the public and between the public and governing bodies) (Beierle
and Cayford 2002). Georgia’s water plan implementation is very nascent. Although the
state is currently implementing the plans, this study proposes a complete model to
examine the entire water planning process in future studies.
Sabatier (2005) advises scholars to move from the study of policy implementation
to the study of policy change. In the case of Georgia, this would mean focusing less on
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the way that water policy implementation and more on the way water policy has changed.
However, using theory to analyze implementation is a way to examine how water policy
has changed. Thus, this study recognizes that nothing is final in policymaking while
simultaneously examining what has changed thus far. If Sabatier’s concern is that the
term “implementation” is too static to study a dynamic, changing process, then the term
needs redefinition. As some scholars have argued, implementation is “a continuing,
dynamic, often turbulent process,” and analyzing the changes that have occurred for a
policy includes how that policy was implemented (Kettl and Fesler 2009, p 369). Thus,
the study of implementation is possible, but the term cannot be restricted to single
moments in time. Therefore, if scholars continue to use theory to analyze the policy
process (including implementation), the analysis inherently examines policy change.
To examine policy change, planning scholars have discussed two ways of
approaching implementation: a performance-based approach and a conformance-based
approach (Laurian et al. 2004, p 472). A performance-based approach views plans as a
reference that guides future decision-making (Laurian et al. 2004, p 472). Kaza and
Hopkins (2009, p 500-501) reinforce these concepts, arguing that plans act as “strategic
information” that allow political, interorganizational, and social networks to try to
manage water resources. Plans can act “as a means of interaction and influence among
organizations rather than as mechanisms of control over a complex multiorganizational
environment” (Kaza and Hopkins 2009, p 491). The plans can be a way for regions in
the state to interact with respect to water resources, but they do not necessarily serve as a
way for GA EPD to govern the complex web of water interests in the state.
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While the performance-based approach has some value for explaining how
organizations interact, the plans have implications for watershed outcomes in Georgia
(Sabatier et al. 2005). In the conformance-based approach, scholars analyze the
outcomes of the planning process and the relationship between plans and their resulting
impacts (Laurian et al. 2004, p 472). This study uses the conformance-based approach
because it adheres more closely to implementation research in the policy literature, which
argues for linking outcomes and policy (see Pressman and Wildavsky 1984).
Several studies use a conformance-based approach. For example, Burby and
Dalton (1994, p 235) showed that land use plans were an effective way to accomplish the
“policy goal of limiting development in hazardous areas.” Their research also showed
that without state or federal mandate enforcement, local governments are not likely to
link land use plans with hazard mitigation (Burby and Dalton 1994, p 235). Because
Georgia mandated the water plans, one could hypothesize that the state water mandate,
when continually monitored and enforced, will result in positive watershed outcomes
(recognizing that “positive watershed outcomes” would need further definition).
In another study, Laurian et al. (2004) examined permits as a way of assessing
outcomes of stormwater and urban amenity management in New Zealand. They found
that permits only implemented a small percentage of policies – around 9 to 18 percent
(Laurian et al. 2004, p 476). Overall, they found that implementation “varied widely by
locality and issue” (Laurian et al. 2004, p 476). Similarly, Norton (2005) found that
some local plans (in this case, coastal land-use policies) can provide “limited guidance”
even when the plans are written in accordance with state mandates (p 55).
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Brody and Highfield (2005) examined the link between local environmental plans
in Florida and associated wetland permitting and management. Using GIS, the authors
were able to spatially analyze areas where wetland degradation had occurred in relation
to nonconformance with wetlands permits, which served as a proxy for the local
environmental plans.
Overall, these studies reveal the importance of enforcement in implementation.
Principal-agent theory, or agency theory, is an approach developed around the
relationship between enforcement and implementation (Wood and Waterman, 1994, 22).
The main assumption in principal-agent theory is that principals (for example, elected
officials such as the president or Congressional representatives) are motivated to manage
and control agents (for example, bureaucracies) (Eisenhardt 1988; Wood and Waterman,
1994, 22).
While principal-agent theory examines the relationship between elected officials
and bureaucracies, the theory is also applicable to relationships between bureaucracies
and the individuals and groups they govern. Applying the principal-agent theory to
Georgia’s water planning, the state agency acting as the principal is the GA EPD. The
agents in this case are the actors regulated by the newly created regional water
management plans.
Under agency theory, the GA EPD (principal) attempts to influence the
performance of regulated watershed users (agents). The water plans adopted by each
region act as a contract that specifies watershed users’ duties and the actions the GA EPD
is supposed to take in response (Eisenhardt 1988; Wood and Waterman, 1994, 22-23).
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Viewing the relationship as a contract, the GA EPD is the purchaser of services and water
users are providers of services (Wood and Waterman, 1994, 22-23). The GA EPD tries
to influence water users’ behavior by manipulating the terms of the water plans.
Overall, policy scholars reveal theory is important for understanding policy and
plan implementation and planning scholars link theory to methodology (Brody and
Highfield 2005; Laurian et al. 2004; Burby and Dalton 1994, p 235). Borrowing ideas
from these scholars, the “regional plan implementation variable” in this study’s model is
established – see Figure 2.

K. The Model and the Dissertation
The model built in this section utilizes literature on policymaking, planning, and
watershed collaboratives, while also using Georgia’s water planning process as the model
in practice. However, this model is an ideal (i.e., what should have happened in Georgia
based on the institutions the state put in place for water planning). While other states can
use the model, policymakers and planners may want to adapt the approach to the
particular context for that state. As scholars have shown, context is a contributing factor
to the planning and policymaking process outcomes and procedures (Laurian 2004;
Sabatier et al. 2005); this is why the study’s theoretical model begins with a context
variable.
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Figure 5: Dissertation Focus Area and Water Planning Process Evaluation Framework

With the model providing context for the overall changes in water planning in
Georgia, the main focus of the dissertation will be on the two-way arrow that reveals the
influence between the social, interorganizational, and political networks and the regional
plan writing – see Figure 5. Public participation occurred in the regional plan-writing as
dictated by each region’s public participation plan. This model assumes that networks
attempted to influence the regional plan-writing and that the structure and process of
regional plan-writing also influenced the public participation from these networks. The
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next section discusses more information about the relationship between the variables of
concern.

IV.

Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Methodologies
The main research question for this dissertation is broad: How did the

institutional, policy, legislative, and planning structures influence public participation in
Georgia’s regional water planning process compared to the theoretical model proposed in
this study? In an attempt to answer the larger research question, the study focuses on
two more specific ones. First, the dissertation addresses how, if at all, the public
participation plans (i.e., the rules of the game) contained elements that scholarly literature
argues should be a component of public participation (information-sharing, targeting
citizen groups, designing forums to solicit public input, etc.). To answer the first
question, each region’s public participation plan was coded to find similarities and
differences between the actual plans and the literature.
Second, the dissertation analyzes the collaborative nature of the public
participation across the regions. For the second question, all available formal
communications (meeting summaries, public comments, etc.) from the regions were
analyzed to see how (and to what extent) public participation occurred during the water
planning process. In particular, this study examined the comments from public
participants at public meetings and commenting periods. One limitation to examining
available formal communications is that it relies on secondary sources instead of
participant observation in each region.
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The second question also includes an examination of the extent regional councils
followed (or ignored) the public participation plans. By answering these questions, the
study demonstrates how the public participation rules hindered or facilitated public
participation and how the participation process in Georgia compares to the theoretical
model for watershed planning and policymaking.

A. Public Participation Plans
Examining the public participation plans provides insight into the institutional,
policy, legislative, and planning structures that facilitated or hindered public participation
during the creation of the regional water plans. Analyzing the participation plans also
reveals whether or not the rules established a truly collaborative process. As the
literature review and theoretical model have revealed, there are particular elements in a
process that promotes effective participation. Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Given the literature-based components that are integral to
facilitating a collaborative process that includes significant public participation,
the public participation plans for each region incorporate these desired elements.
In addition, the examination revealed whether participation plans were identical or if
there was variation across the plan structure. A rubric was developed to test this
hypothesis and analyze the participation plans; the rubric is based on scholarly literature
on public participation and collaborative processes. The rubric followed the planning
quality literature in initial structure but was tailored to analyze factors such as the
permitted forms of participation and stages at which participation was used in the
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planning (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Margerum 2011). For Hypothesis 1, the
unit of analysis was the water planning regions (specifically, each region’s public
participation plan). Overall, testing hypothesis 1 provided an institutional analysis that
shed light on the “rules of the game” for public participation in the regional planning
process (Ostrom 1990).
This part of the study uses “plan evaluation” as a method. Plan evaluation is
similar to plan/policy implementation with one significant difference: plan evaluation
focuses on plan/policy quality (and at times, outcomes), while studies on plan/policy
implementation focuses on plan/policy outcomes (Brody 2003a; Brody 2003 b; Berke et
al. 2006). Also, the evaluation examines internal and external plan quality (Berke et al.
2006). Internal plan quality deals with content and formatting of the plan (in this case,
the structuring of the public participation in the water planning process); external plan
quality relates to how the plan fits into the larger planning/policymaking structure. As
discussed further in Subpart I [“Collective-Choice Rules (Plans)”] of the Theoretical
Model section, plan evaluation methodologies are useful to study any type of plan (Berke
et al. 2006). In this case, plan evaluation is a method to examine the public participation
plans in Georgia. As discussed previously, one of the major contributions of this study is
developing a way to analyze public participation plans using plan evaluation literature in
conjunction with collaborative and public participation literatures.
Using this structure, this study attempted to examine the public participation plans
used by each region. Elements of the plan evaluation include Margerum’s (2011, p 88)
factors for assessing deliberation and participation. Margerum (2011, p 88) focuses on
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facilitated process, open communication, conflict management, and public involvement.
Margerum’s approach is discussed further throughout the “Theoretical Model” section of
this study. In addition, other important factors for public participation that have been
discussed in the “Literature Review” and “Theoretical Model” sections are also included
in the rubric (for example, Beierle’s (1999) social goals and Brody, Godschalk, and
Burby’s (2003) criteria for enhancing public involvement). The rubric is included in
Table 3.
Table 3: Rubric for Public Participation Plan Assessment
Internal Characteristics (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231)
1) Facilitated Process: “Process of consensus building is facilitated to
maximize participation” (Margerum 2011, p 88)
A) Open Communication (Margerum 2011, p 88-90)
 Other opinions and other point-of-views are to be considered
 Two-way flow of information (Margerum 2011, p 97)/Informationsharing procedures (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003, p 246)
 Communication with participating organizations
 Outreach and education processes are included (Beierle 1999;
Margerum 2011, p 108)
B) Conflict Management, Debate, and Discussion (Beierle 1999;
Margerum 2011, p 88-90)
 Procedures for dispute resolution
 Clear ground rules for how the group operates
 Process facilitated by a neutral third party
 Coalition or social-capital building; building trust (Beierle 1999)

C) Exploration (Margerum 2011, p 90)
 Process to explore positions of others, other interests, or brainstorm
ideas
D) Decision making (Margerum 2011, p 91)
 There are clear rules in place for decision making (Margerum
2011, p 88)
 Group is to seek consensus (but not required it for closure)
(Margerum 2011, p 102). Deliberation focuses on consensus
(Margerum 2011, p 88-90)
 The public is solicited for its views (Beierle 1999; Margerum 2011,
p 108)
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Coding:
0 = no reference
1 = mentioned, but guidelines
vague
2 = clear guidelines*
(Brody 2003a; Berke et al.
2006)
*guidelines for this
characteristic are obvious and
understandable. This concept’s
application is explained more in
the Hypothesis 1 Analysis

E) Facilitator role
 Is role specified (listener, interpreter, guide, balancer, collaborator,
or manager)? (Forester 1989; Margerum 2011, p 93)
2) Public Involvement (Margerum 2011, p 88)
A) Objectives for public participation are clear (Objectives include the
ways the public will be involved (for example, deciding if the public
will be allowed to influence the process, give their opinion, or just be
educated about the process). (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003, p
246)
B) The plan targets which citizen groups to involve (Brody, Godschalk,
and Burby 2003, p 246)
C) The approach to public input is tailored to the collaborative (i.e.,
“forums and events are designed to solicit public input”) (Margerum
2011, p 108)
D) Techniques include the different kinds of forums for participation
(for example, public meetings, public comments, etc). (Brody,
Godschalk, and Burby 2003)

Coding:
0 = no reference
1 = one
2 = two or more

E) Stages of public participation(Chess and Purcell 1999; Brody,
Godschalk, and Burby 2003, p 246; Tippett, Searle, Pahl-Wostl, and
Rees 2005)

Coding:
0 = no reference
1 = Public only included at
particular stages
2 = Included throughout whole
process

F) Communication affecting public participation

Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 =
one, 2 = two or more

External Characteristics (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231)
3) Organization and presentation: “Provisions to enhance
understandability for a wide range of readers” (Berke and Godschalk
2009, p 231). Each of the following elements below is coded
separately.
 Table of contents, glossary of terms, executive summary
 Clear visuals (maps, charts, pictures, and diagrams)
 Supporting documents (video, CD, Web page)

Coding:
0 = no reference
1 = one
2 = two or more

4) Interorganizational coordination: “Integration with other plans or
policies of public and private parties” (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p
231). Each of the following elements below is coded separately.
 Vertical coordination with plans or policies of federal, state, and
regional parties
 Horizontal coordination with plans or policies of other local parties
within or outside local jurisdiction

Coding:
0 = no reference
1 = meets requirement
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5) Compliance: “Consistent with the purpose of plan mandates” (Berke
and Godschalk 2009, p 231)
 Required elements are included in plan

Coding:
0 = no reference
1 = meets requirement
Maximum Score = 47

Each public participation plan was scored using the rubric, and the scores were used to
compare and contrast how each region structured public participation (Berke et al. 2006).
To further analyze the scores from the rubric, socioeconomic and demographic data were
integrated into the analysis to examine how (if at all) economic and population variables
were related to the public participation scores. As Laurian (2004) found, individuals with
more economic means tended to participate more than those with less economic
resources. Thus, regions should design their public participation plans to ensure that
people with lower socioeconomic resources would participate. In addition, variables
were introduced to see if the public participation scores correlated at all with population
of the regions. This study hypothesizes that regions with larger populations created
public participation plans that accounted for the complexities with the numerous actors
involved in the process. Thus, this study examines the relationship between population
and the public participation plans.
The variables used were total population for each region, median population for
each region, median household income for each region, and median percentage of total
population in each region; these variables were used to see if they correlated with the
public participation plan scores. Metro North Georgia (the Atlanta water planning
region) has not been included in this study because its water planning process has been
different from the rest of the state. All of the socioeconomic and demographic data came
from the U.S. Census Bureau, and 2011 was chosen because it was the year that the
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regional water plans were adopted. The plan-writing occurred from 2009 to 2011, and all
regions grew in population during that time; Middle Chattahoochee grew the most
(2.88%). The population change, however, did not change significantly in any of the
regions over those years, so 2011 numbers were used for consistency – see Table 4.
Table 4: Total Population Change in Each Region During Plan-Writing
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

% Change between 2009 and 2011
1.08
2.23
1.90
0.74
2.88
1.10
1.15
0.37
0.55
1.05

B. Analyzing Public Participation
Analyzing the public participation plans revealed the rules implemented to
facilitate public input. However, the examination only provides the ways in which
participation was structured. There is also a need to analyze the process to see how (and
to what extent) public participation facilitation occurred. This is methodologically
challenging, since it relies on secondary sources rather than participant observation in
each region. Maintaining consistency in assumptions, the second hypothesis is as
follows:
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Hypothesis 2: Assuming the participation plans established rules to foster public
input, an analysis of formal communications and secondary sources demonstrates
that a legitimately collaborative process occurred in each region.
From a preliminary review of the water planning process, public meetings and public
comments were the primary way for the public to participate. Documents from public
meetings and public commenting were available on the Georgia water planning website
(www.georgiawaterplanning.org). In addition, the consultants from each region were
asked if the public submitted other letters, statements, or other correspondence to the
councils. Using the gathered information, a qualitative textual analysis and quantitative
content analysis were performed to ascertain the composition, extent, mechanisms, and
character of information the participants provided (Weber 1990; Golden 1998; Neuendorf
2002). For Hypothesis 2, the unit of analysis was individuals’ and organizations’
comments; and, for further analysis, these comments were aggregated by region.
For this study, a mixed-method approach was used to analyze content from public
meetings and public commenting periods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Cresswell
2013). To analyze all the public comments made available from the water planning
process, I performed a qualitative textual analysis to reveal themes in the data (Ayres,
Kavanaugh, and Knafl 2003). This approach included qualitatively analyzing the
comments to “decontextualize” the data (Ayres, Kavanaugh, and Knafl 2003, p 872;
Malterud, K. 2012). Individual comments are unique to a particular participant; but,
through sorting and coding, the data are decontextualized. This process is explained in
more detail below:
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Data are decontextualized when they are separated into units of meaning through
coding and sorting. These data are decontextualized because they are separated
from the individual cases in which they originated. Data are recontextualized as
they are reintegrated into themes that combine units of like meaning taken from
the accounts of multiple research respondents. These recontextualized data create
a reduced data set drawn from across all cases. The researcher uses the reduced
data set to explore theoretical or process relationships among these clusters of
meaning (Ayres, Kavanaugh, and Knafl 2003, p 872).
This process is a variation on Malterud’s (2012) approach to qualitatively analyzing data:
1) finding themes in text, 2) coding the themes, and 3) finding meaning in the codes. In
order to decontextualize and find themes in the data, I used a coding scheme to sort the
data – see Table 5 for the coding scheme. I then developed a codebook to recontextualize
the data, developing “clusters of meaning” (Ayres, Kavanaugh, and Knafl 2003, p 872).
The codebook is available in Appendix B.
Table 5: Coding scheme for public comments
Variables of interest
Comment submitted/stated at public
meeting or during commenting period
Type of meeting or commenting period

Consultant associated with region

Region

Codes
Public meeting or commenting period
Meeting: Regional or joint (if regional,
then also given label 1 through 11)
Commenting period: resource assessment
or final draft
Consultant label (for example, Consultant
A, B, C, D) – actual company names were
not used
Region label (Coastal Georgia, Upper
Flint, etc). If comment applies to multiple
regions, then all regions mentioned were
included
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For meetings, number of public
commenters
For meetings, number of attendees from
public
For commenting period, number of
commenters
Type of concern
Category of concern
Count of concerns

Members of public
Interest group type

Number of public commenters at meetings
Number of citizens and stakeholders listed
in attendance at meetings
Number of commenters
Policy or Process
Codebook was used
Counted the number of times concerns
came up in meetings and commenting
periods.
Names of public attendees
Government, interest groups, unknown,
individuals, academics, utilities, business
(Golden 1998)

The coding scheme distinguishes between comments submitted in public
commenting periods and comments stated at public meetings. In addition, the coding
scheme further distinguishes whether the meetings were regional (one region) or joint
(several regions); and, the coding scheme differentiates the subject of the commenting
period (i.e., resources assessments or the draft regional water plans). Two other variables
of interest are the consultant associated with each region and the region itself. If a
comment was directed at multiple regions, then all those regions were included in coding.
Coding also included the number of public commenters (at both meetings and public
commenting periods) and the number of citizens at the meetings. For commenting
periods, coding included the number of commenters.
As previously discussed, this study conducted a qualitative textual analysis for all
of the comments from public meetings and public commenting periods; specifically, the
text was descriptively coded to detect commenters’ patterns of concerns. Descriptive
coding allows researchers to discover the topics discussed in a text (Saldaña 2009).
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These topics were then aggregated into categories inductively derived from the data
(Bidwell and Ryan 2006, p 832; Jewell and Bero 2006, p 635). The policy and process
codes were designated with categories to specify the items of concern about the plans and
processes. For example, a commenter might discuss how she was concerned about data
use in the plan so that comment would be coded, “policy – data use.” If a commenter
discussed how he was concerned about the time allotted for the entire planning process,
then that comment was coded, “process – time allotment.” A list or codebook was
created throughout the process so that codes and categories were consistently applied.
Overall, the coding process revealed the concerns raised by commenters about the water
plans and planning process.
The analysis also included the names of each person and interest group
association (Golden 1998). This study examined if the people who went to public
meetings were the same as people who submitted public comments. This qualitative
analysis revealed which, if any, groups or networks were involved.
After finishing the qualitative analysis, a quantitative content analysis was
conducted to see if the thematic categories differed among water planning regions.
Content analysis is “the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message
characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002, p 1). As Weber (1990, p 13) argues, “there is no
simple right way to do content analysis.” Instead, researchers must use methods to
analyze content that are appropriate for the question they are trying to answer (Weber
1990).
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To answer the question of how public participation took place in the Georgia
water planning process, the coding process quantified data from the public’s comments.
Specifically, this study is concerned with “event counts” or count data – i.e., “the number
of times an event occurs” (Cameron and Trivedi 2013, p 1). Count data are non-negative
integers that can be aggregated for use as a response variable (Cameron and Trivedi
2013). For this study, the “count” is the number of times certain concerns were discussed
by the public (as previously discussed, the “concerns” were derived through a qualitative
examination of the data). The socioeconomic variables discussed under Hypothesis 1
were also integrated in the quantitative analysis to see (if at all) the economic and
population statistics correlated with any of the participation-related concerns raised
during the water planning process.
Overall, this study employed a mixed-method approach that included a qualitative
analysis of the text, as well as a quantitative analysis of count data (Cresswell 2013). The
specific statistical tests used to analyze the quantitative data will be discussed in the
findings section. The coding and analyses revealed whether or not some regions had more
public participation than others, how the public participated, and how concerns about the
participation process varied (if at all) across the regions.

C. Methodological Limitations
One issue that arose in conducting this study was intercoder reliability. Intercoder
reliability is “a measure of the extent to which independent judges make the same coding
decisions in evaluating the characteristics of messages” (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and
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Campanella Bracken. 2006, p 587). For this study, only the author made the coding
decisions, so this form of validity is a drawback to the dissertation. However, this study
includes examples of how the rubric was applied to the public participation plans
(Hypothesis 1) and how comments were organized into themes (Hypothesis 2). Thus, the
reader can gain some insight into the public participation plan analysis and examination
and aggregation of comments.
In addition, this study originally proposed to survey public participants. Upon
analysis of the available data, however, the documentation of who participated was
inconsistent (this issue is discussed further in Section VI: Results – Hypothesis 2). In
future studies, participants can be engaged to learn about their experience.

V.

Results – Hypothesis 1
There were two major findings from the analysis for the first hypothesis: 1) Based

on the rubric, the plans did not fully realize a structure to facilitate effective public
participation; 2) The public participation plans were almost entirely the same. There are
a few differences in the plans, which will be described in greater detail; however, because
the regions mostly used guidance verbatim from GA EPD, the plans are largely identical
(see Appendix C in this study for a copy of the template; this template can also be found
in Appendix B of GA EPD 2009).
The guidance from GA EPD was helpful in creating the public participation plans
in that it provided a framework; however, the state’s guidelines may have been a
hindrance in that the regions did little to exceed the template provided to them. In the
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regional planning guidance for the regions, GA EPD provides the following description
of their template:
Regional water planning councils will adopt a Public Involvement Plan based on
the following template. The template establishes the basic public involvement
activities to be undertaken by all regional water planning councils…The regional
water planning councils with assistance from regional water planning contractors
should complete the following form, including specifying additional elements that
may be identified by each council (GA EPD 2009, p 41).
The instructions gave little room for different ways of approaching public participation.
While providing a template was useful to mandate minimal instructions, public input on
the template would have been constructive since the public was governed by the rules (or,
if public input was provided on the template, GA EPD should have made that information
available when the template was released). Also, GA EPD needed to show that the
template would facilitate a collaborative process; the template could have been better
vetted to ensure that inclusive techniques and forums were used (as discussed in the
remainder of this chapter). Overall, the template’s influence is evident in rest of this
analysis.
As discussed in the “Hypotheses and Methods” section of this study, a rubric was
used to analyze the regions’ public participation plans. The first aspect examined was the
plans’ elements of open communication. See Table 6 for coding.
In terms of considering other opinions and point-of-views, all the regions used
some variation of the wording from the GA EPD guidance, which read, “Input from the
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public, key stakeholders, and the members of the Local Government Advisory Body will
be considered and incorporated in regional water planning council work products” (see
Appendix B of GA EPD 2009, p 41). Therefore, the regions’ public participation plans
provided a clear objective that public input should be used to create the water plans
(coded “2” for “clear guidelines”).
Table 6: Elements of Open Communication (Margerum 2011, p 88-90)
Region

Altamaha
Coosa-North
Georgia
Coastal Georgia
Lower FlintOchlockonee
Middle
Chattahoochee
Middle
Ocmulgee
SavannahUpper
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Other opinions
and other point-ofviews are to be
considered
2
2

Two-way flow of
information/Informat
ion-sharing
procedures
1
1

Communication
with participating
organizations

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible

1
1

Outreach and
education
processes are
included
0
0

2
2

1
1

1
1

0
0

4 of 8
4 of 8

2

1

1

0

4 of 8

2

1

1

1

5 of 8

2

1

1

0

4 of 8

2
2
2

1
1
1

1
1
1

0
0
2

4 of 8
4 of 8
6 of 8

4 of 8
4 of 8

Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = mentioned, but guidelines vague, 2 = clear guidelines

In terms of two-way flow of information and information-sharing procedures, the
plans were all very clear and structured in how the public could provide information to
the councils. However, the ways in which the councils would provide information to the
public was not very clear. All ten regions discussed how they would provide dates,
times, and agendas about upcoming public meetings. In addition, all the regions stated
they would provide meeting summaries on their website and distribute the summaries to a
list of media contacts. However, this was really the only information councils promised
to provide. The only other mention of providing information to the public was in two of
the ten plans; these two plans mentioned responding to public comments as deemed
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appropriate by the council. While useful, there were no specific guidelines on when these
responses would occur. Thus, the “rules of the game” for information-sharing really only
allowed for the public and interested groups to provide information to the councils in
very structured public commenting periods or designated times at public meetings. The
public participation plans did little to explain how or when councils would provide
information to the public, so this was coded as “mentioned, but guidelines vague” for
information-sharing for all ten regions.
In addition to the importance of a two-way flow of information, the rubric also
examined the regional councils’ communication to participating organizations. From
analysis of the plans, participating individuals and organizations could expect
information about dates, times, and agendas for upcoming public meetings, but there
were no set guidelines about when other types of communication would occur. This
finding does not indicate whether communication occurred with participating
organizations; instead, this analysis simply recognizes that the public participation plans
did not discuss how communication with participation with organizations would occur.
All the plans stated, “The regional water planning council and local government officials
should identify proper communication pathways” (GA EPD 2009, p 44), which suggests
that GA EPD and the regions recognized the importance of communicating with groups
such as local government officials. However, the plans did not discuss how these
communications would occur (coded as “mentioned, but guidelines vague”).
The fourth element of open communication analyzed was the inclusion of
outreach and education processes in the public participation plans. Only two regions,
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Middle Ocmulgee and Upper Oconee even mentioned outreach in their plans. Middle
Ocmulgee stated, “Providing public outreach and involvement that is proactive and as
wide reaching to all facets of the population as possible” (Middle Ocmulgee 2011, p 1).
Later in the document, however, their only additional outreach discussion mentioned was
allowing the public to make comments directly on their website. This “outreach” did little
beyond making public commenting easier. On the other hand, Upper Oconee specified
that the council members should make presentations at civic and community meetings to
help people in the region understand the regional water planning process and the
council’s role, which would allow for both outreach and education to its region’s
members (Upper Oconee 2011). See coding in Table 6 – most of the regions received a
“0” code for “no reference;” Middle Ocmulgee and Upper Oconee’s outreach were coded
“1” and “2”, respectively, since each region discussed outreach to varying degrees.
Overall, the elements of open communication examined here were lacking
pathways for information-sharing, communication to participating organizations, and
opportunities for outreach and education. As discussed in the literature review and
continued in the theoretical model, public meetings and public commenting periods have
been criticized by scholars for the lack of deliberation afforded to the public, so with
these two avenues as the only ways to provide input, there is concern that open
communication was not a priority in these guidelines. In addition, communication allows
policymakers to educate the public, incorporate public values in policy, and create trust in
institutions (Beierle 1999); without communication from the councils to the public
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embedded in the public participation plans, there will be difficulty in meeting social
goals.
Another aspect the public participation plan rubric examined was conflict
management, debate, and discussion – see Table 7. Margerum (2011) argues that in order
for a consensus-based planning process to occur, there must be rules in place for dispute
resolution and for how the group will operate.
Table 7: Conflict Management, Debate, and Discussion (Margerum 2011, p 88-90)
Region

Altamaha
Coosa-North Georgia
Coastal Georgia
Lower FlintOchlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Procedures for
dispute
resolution
0
0
0
0

Clear ground rules
for how the group
operates
2
2
2
2

Process facilitated by
a neutral third party
1
1
1
1

Coalition or
social-capital
building
0
0
0
0

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible
3 of 8
3 of 8
3 of 8
3 of 8

0
0
0

2
2
2

1
1
1

0
0
0

3 of 8
3 of 8
3 of 8

0
0
0

2
2
2

1
1
1

0
0
0

3 of 8
3 of 8
3 of 8

Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = mentioned, but guidelines vague, 2 = clear guidelines

After examining the participation plans, it was clear that they structured the water
planning process in a way that put the councils in complete control. None of the public
participation plans had procedures for dispute resolution (thus, they were coded “0” for
“no reference”). Dispute resolution was not needed (between the public and the councils)
because the only way for anyone other than the council members to participate was
highly structured. There was no structure for dialogue between the councils and the
public – just ways for the public to submit comments.
Because the rules for participation were highly structured, the plans were clear on
ground rules on how the group operated (thus, the plans were all coded “2” for “clear
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guidelines”). Any time a member of the public or any stakeholder wanted to make a
comment at the public meetings, there were designated times (and time limits) for such
comments. Otherwise, the only other avenue for participation was to submit written
comments. Even though there were clear ground rules, this did not mean that the rules
were conducive for participation – this variable only determines whether there were clear
ground rules for how the group operated. Other variables cover the conduciveness of
participation.
Another aspect of the public participation plans (and specifically, the aspects of
the plans that covered conflict management, debate, and discussion) examined was
whether the process was facilitated by a neutral third party. There was a neutral third
party involved in the water planning process in Georgia. As the GA EPD guidance
stated, “The regional water planning councils, assisted by their regional planning
contractors, will follow the adopted Public Involvement Plan to provide opportunities for
meaningful input from key stakeholders, the members of local government advisory
body, and the general public” (GA EPD 2009, p 41). The contractors, however, were only
there to assist. The public participation plans gave the councils and the Council Chair
power over how the process occurred. While a neutral third party was involved, the
extent to which they were able to facilitate was unclear when reading the public
participation plans (thus, the variable for this part of the plans was given a code of “1” for
“mentioned, but guidelines vague”).
In addition to the importance of the third party facilitation, Margerum (2011)
discusses the need for coalition or social-capital building. However, the public
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participation plans do not structure the water planning process in a way to establish a
relationship between council and public/stakeholders. Thus, social-capital building was
not part of the public participation plan (thus, the variable for this part of the plans was
given a code of “0” for “no reference”).
Another aspect the public participation plan rubric examined was whether the
public participation plans provided a process to explore positions of others, other
interests, or brainstorm ideas (Margerum 2011, p 90). While the public participation
plans stated that councils must consider and incorporate input from the public into the
water planning, there are no specifics on how to incorporate this input. Since the
guidelines were vague on how to consider the public’s views, all the plans coded “1” for
“mentioned, but guidelines vague”– See Table 8.
Table 8: Exploration (Margerum 2011, p 90)
Region

Process to explore
Score =
positions of others
Actual/Total Possible
Altamaha
1
1 of 2
Coosa-North Georgia
1
1 of 2
Coastal Georgia
1
1 of 2
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
1
1 of 2
Middle Chattahoochee
1
1 of 2
Middle Ocmulgee
1
1 of 2
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
1
1 of 2
Suwanee-Satilla
1
1 of 2
Upper Flint
1
1 of 2
Upper Oconee
1
1 of 2
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = mentioned, but guidelines vague, 2 = clear guidelines

In addition to exploring the idea of others, Margerum (2011) also discusses the
importance in the way decision-making will occur in a facilitated process – see Table 9.
In the regions’ public participation plans, there are very clear rules for how the group will
operate. However, there are no clear rules on how decision-making will occur. The
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public participation plans discuss when the councils will allow the public to provide
comments, but the plans do not discuss how council decisions will be made (i.e., how the
public’s comments will be a factor in the decision-making). Thus, the variable for this
part of the plans coded “0” for “no reference.”
Table 9: Decision-making (Margerum 2011, p 91)
Region

There are clear
rules in place for
decision making
0
0

The public is
solicited for
its views
2
2

Group is to seek
consensus (but not
required it for closure)
0
0

Altamaha
Coosa-North
Georgia
Coastal Georgia
0
2
0
Lower Flint0
2
0
Ochlockonee
Middle
0
2
0
Chattahoochee
Middle
0
2
0
Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper
0
2
0
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
0
2
0
Upper Flint
0
2
0
Upper Oconee
0
2
0
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = mentioned, but guidelines vague, 2 = clear guidelines

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6
2 of 6

Another aspect of decision-making to consider is if the public is solicited for its
views; in this case, all the regions’ public participation plans focused on garnering public
input (so, each region was coded as having “clear guidelines” for “public is solicited for
its views”). However, another important aspect of decision-making is for the group is to
seek consensus (although consensus is not required for final decisions) (Margerum 2011).
This aspect is particularly important since Georgia called its water rulemaking a
“consensus-based planning process” (GA EPD 2009, p 5). Somewhat surprising, not a
single public participation plan discussed consensus. Consensus may have played a role
in the decision-making process, but the public was not a part of decision-making. If the
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public was not a part of decision-making, then Georgia’s water planning process raises
the question of consensus between which parties. Therefore, the variable for consensus
was coded “0” for “no reference.”
The role of the facilitator is also important in a facilitated process. As previously
discussed, the public participation plans dictated that the regional planning contractors
(i.e., facilitators) assist the regional water planning councils. In particular, the
contractors’ job was to help the council gather public input and public comments. While
the contractors were a part of the process, the councils had ultimate power over how the
process occurred. In this case, Margerum (2011) would likely argue that the contractors’
role is to be a listener. Therefore, the facilitator role variable was coded “2” for “clear
guidelines.”
Table 10: Facilitator Role (Margerum 2011, p 93)
Region

Facilitator role

Score =
Actual/Total Possible
Altamaha
2
2 of 2
Coosa-North Georgia
2
2 of 2
Coastal Georgia
2
2 of 2
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
2
2 of 2
Middle Chattahoochee
2
2 of 2
Middle Ocmulgee
2
2 of 2
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
2
2 of 2
Suwanee-Satilla
2
2 of 2
Upper Flint
2
2 of 2
Upper Oconee
2
2 of 2
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = mentioned, but guidelines vague, 2 = clear guidelines

Thus far, this analysis has explored open communication, conflict management,
exploration of ideas, decision-making, and facilitator roles as these are some of the key
components that the literature argues are a part of a facilitated process. The next part this
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section analyzes the extent to which public involvement was truly a focus of the public
participation plans.
In order for public participation to be successful, the objectives for the
participation have to be clear. As previously mentioned, objectives include the ways the
public will be involved (for example, deciding if the public will be allowed to influence
the process, give their opinion, or just be educated about the process) (Brody, Godschalk,
and Burby 2003, p 246). In the case of the Georgia, the regions’ public participation
plans had very clear objectives: allow the public to give their opinion. Thus, the variable,
“objectives for public participation are clear,” for each plan was coded “2” for “clear
guidelines.”
Another aspect of the public involvement examined was whether the plan targets
which citizen groups to involve (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003, p 246). All the
plans listed general groups of stakeholders (agriculture, local government, utilities, etc.)
to include in the planning process. While some regions, such as Middle Ocmulgee, listed
more groups than others, the list of groups was still very general. Thus, the targeting
variable was coded as “1” for “mentioned, but guidelines vague” for each plan.
In addition, the plans were examined to see if the approach to public input was
tailored to the collaborative (i.e., “forums and events are designed to solicit public input”)
(Margerum 2011, p 108). The plans stated that council meetings were open to the public
and must allow time for the public to submit comments. Also, there were commenting
periods when the public could submit comments about the draft regional water plans.
Thus, public input was tailored to the collaborative and the variable was coded as having
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“clear guidelines” (Margerum 2011, p 108) - see Table 11. This variable does not
determine how well these forums solicit public input – only whether the public was
solicited for input.
Table 11: Public Involvement (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Margerum 2011)
Region

Objectives for
public participation
are clear

Plan targets
which citizen
groups to
involve
1
1

Approach to public
input is tailored to the
collaborative

Altamaha
2
2
Coosa-North
2
2
Georgia
Coastal Georgia
2
1
2
Lower Flint2
1
2
Ochlockonee
Middle
2
1
2
Chattahoochee
Middle
2
1
2
Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper
2
1
2
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
2
1
2
Upper Flint
2
1
2
Upper Oconee
2
1
2
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = mentioned, but guidelines vague, 2 = clear guidelines

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6
5 of 6

There were also techniques that included different kinds of forums for public
participation – public commenting periods and public meetings (so, the techniques
variable was coded as “2” for “2 or more forums” for each region). Once again, this
variable does not measure the degree to which the forums are helpful in soliciting
participation – only that they are forums to garner public input.
In addition to different forums for participation, this study examined the different
stages of the planning process. In the case of Georgia’s regional water planning, the
public was only involved at very specific stages. In particular, they were not involved in
choosing who sat on the councils or how the councils’ decision-making would occur –
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see Table 12. Therefore, the “public participation stages” variable was coded “1” for
each region because the public was only included at particular stages – not the whole
planning process.
Table 12: Public Involvement (continued)
Region

Techniques include
the different kinds
of forums for
participation*
2
2

Stages of public
participation**

Communication
affecting public
participation***

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible

Altamaha
1
1
4 of 6
Coosa-North
1
1
4 of 6
Georgia
Coastal Georgia
2
1
1
4 of 6
Lower Flint2
1
2
5 of 6
Ochlockonee
Middle
2
1
2
5 of 6
Chattahoochee
Middle
2
1
2
5 of 6
Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper
2
1
1
4 of 6
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
2
1
2
5 of 6
Upper Flint
2
1
2
5 of 6
Upper Oconee
2
1
1
4 of 6
*Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = one, 2 = two or more forums
**Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = Public included at particular stages, 2 = Included through whole process
***Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = one way of communicating, 2 = two or more ways of communicating

While communication with participating organizations was examined (see Table 6
for the organizations’ communication variable), communication directly to the public was
also analyzed. Communication to the public includes the ways in which participation
opportunities and announcements were communicated to the community at-large (as
opposed to the communication directed at participating organizations such as
environmental groups, utilities, etc – coding is shown in Table 12). All the regions stated
they would provide notice of meetings on their websites. However, Savannah-Upper
Ogeechee and Upper Oconee gave a two-week notice for meetings while Suwanee-Satilla
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provided a 72-hour notice; all other regions stated that they would provide a 24-hour
notice for public meetings. In addition, all the regions stated they would provide
summaries of public meetings and several stated they would provide press releases about
the meetings. While some regions only referenced one way of communicating about
public participation opportunities (through the website) and others referenced two or
more (website, press releases, etc.), there are is still concern about the timing of the
communication. For example, 24-hour notice (and even 72-hour notice) for a meeting on
a website is not sufficient time to notify the public (Duram and Brown 1999; Irvin and
Stansbury 2004; Tippett, Searle, Pahl-Wostl, and Rees 2005). Councils would have
benefited from better guidance from EPD for public participation plans that included
information about sufficient timing. See Table 13 for meeting notice times.
Table 13: Meeting Notice Times
Region
Altamaha
Coosa-North Georgia
Coastal Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Time for
notice
24-hour
24-hour
24-hour
24-hour
24-hour
24-hour
Two-week
72-hour
24-hour
Two-week

Almost all of the communications were to be provided through the regions’
websites (four of the regions did not even list their website in the public participation
plan). While the internet is an effective way of communicating information, not all
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citizens have access. Press releases and the website were the only two avenues ever
mentioned; email lists, community events, and other avenues of communication for
participation were not mentioned in the plan (Laurian 2004). Only half of the regions
even mentioned utilizing press releases. The coding for this variable (shown in Table 12)
varied depending on whether or not regions stated they would only use websites to
communicate with the public (code = 1) or a combination of websites and press releases
(code = 2). Regardless of the coding, the amount and types of communications with the
public outlined in the public participation plan raised concerns about timing to announce
meeting times, the heavy reliance on the internet (and the public’s access to the internet),
and the lack of avenues for communicating with the public (websites and press releases).
In this analysis thus far, discussions have centered on the internal characteristics
of the public participation plans (the facilitated process and public involvement
elements). There are also external characteristics to examine, which include the public
participation plan’s organization and presentation, interorganizational coordination, and
compliance with plan mandates (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231).
For organization and presentation, none of the plans included a table of contents,
glossary of terms, or executive summary (so, a code of “0” was given for each plan for
this variable) – see Table 14. In addition, none of the public participation plans had
supporting visuals (so, a code of “0” was given for each plan for this variable). Regional
webpages provided the only document support – webpages included meeting summaries,
meeting announcements, GA EPD contact information, and many other planning
documents. And, as previously mentioned, four of the regions did not even list their
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website in their respective public participation plans. Therefore, each plan received a
code of “1” because only one supporting document was provided in each (i.e., the
webpage).
Table 14: Organization and presentation (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231)
Region

Table of contents,
glossary of terms,
executive
summary
0
0

Clear visuals
(maps, charts,
pictures, and
diagrams)
0
0

Altamaha
Coosa-North
Georgia
Coastal Georgia
0
0
Lower Flint0
0
Ochlockonee
Middle
0
0
Chattahoochee
Middle
0
0
Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper
0
0
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
0
0
Upper Flint
0
0
Upper Oconee
0
0
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = one, 2 = two or more

Supporting
documents
(video, CD,
Web page)
1
1

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible

1
1

1 of 6
1 of 6

1

1 of 6

1

1 of 6

1

1 of 6

1
1
1

1 of 6
1 of 6
1 of 6

1 of 6
1 of 6

For interorganizational coordination (see Table 15), all the plans coordinated
vertically with state policies (specifically, GA EPD’s requirements for the public
participation plans), so each region was coded as meeting the requirement for vertical
coordination. In addition, all the plans were horizontally coordinated because they
instructed the councils to gather input from the public, key stakeholders, members of the
Local Government Advisory Body, and adjacent regional water planning councils, so
each region was coded as meeting the requirement for horizontal coordination. The
participation plans did not specify compliance with local comprehensive plans, but they
instructed the councils to gather input broadly from local governments and stakeholders;
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thus, an assumption was made that the councils would ensure horizontal compliance with
all appropriate parties and rules – including local comprehensive plans.
Table 15: Interorganizational coordination (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231)
Region

Vertical coordination
with plans or policies of
federal, state, and
regional parties
1
1

Altamaha
Coosa-North
Georgia
Coastal Georgia
1
Lower Flint1
Ochlockonee
Middle
1
Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
1
Savannah-Upper
1
Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
1
Upper Flint
1
Upper Oconee
1
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = meets requirement

Horizontal coordination
with plans or policies of
other local parties within or
outside local jurisdiction
1
1

Score =
Actual/Total
Possible

1
1

2 of 2
2 of 2

1

2 of 2

1
1

2 of 2
2 of 2

1
1
1

2 of 2
2 of 2
2 of 2

2 of 2
2 of 2

In addition to horizontal and vertical coordination, the extent to which the participation
plans complied with the required elements that had to be in the plan. All the regions were
“consistent with the purpose of plan mandates” by strictly following the GA EPD public
participation guidance, so they met this requirement – see Table 16 (Berke and
Godschalk 2009, p 231).
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Table 16: Compliance (Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231)
Region

Required elements are
included in plan
Altamaha
1
Coosa-North Georgia
1
Coastal Georgia
1
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
1
Middle Chattahoochee
1
Middle Ocmulgee
1
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
1
Suwanee-Satilla
1
Upper Flint
1
Upper Oconee
1
Coding: 0 = no reference, 1 = meets requirement

Score =
Actual/Total Possible
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1
1 of 1

Table 17 lists the total scores of all the plans (and Figure 6 shows the scores
visually). At first glance, there is not a great deal of variation in the results. There are,
however, some differences, and these variations in the results will be discussed further.
Table 17: Total scores
Region
Altamaha
Coosa-North Georgia
Coastal Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwanee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Total score
(Total possible score = 47)
25
25
25
26
26
27
25
26
26
27
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Total score/Total
possible score
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.55
0.55
0.57
0.53
0.55
0.55
0.57

Figure 6: Total score for regions

To further analyze the scores and coding, the analysis integrated regional
demographics (see Table 18). The demographics included each region’s total 2011
population, the median 2011 population, the median household income, and the
percentage of total population in poverty. As discussed previously, Metro North Georgia
is not included in this study because its water planning process has been different from
the rest of the state. But, Metro North Georgia’s regional demographic data was included
in Table 18 in order to show some of the differences between the Atlanta metro area and
the rest of Georgia.
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Table 18: Regional Demographics

Water Region
Altamaha

Total 2011 Pop

Median
2011 Pop

Median Household
Income ($)

Percentage of Total
Population in Poverty
(Median)

255,157

14,093

31,195

28

Coastal Georgia

654,068

52,657

42,383

20

Coosa-North Georgia

747,398

29,938

39,480

19

356,717

22,657

31,217

29

476,159

11,840

37,495

22

Lower FlintOchlockonee
Middle
Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee

572,936

25,113

41,312

20

Savannah-Upper
Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla

612,967

17,557

34,789

23

412,361

16,452

32,447

27

Upper Flint

247,089

14,532

32,842

24

Upper Oconee

554,647

33,326

39,209

19

Metro North Georgia

4,922,961

182,965

56,878

16

A frequency table for the internal characteristics of the plan is included (see Table
1 in Appendix A). The frequency table does not provide any new information not yet
discussed, but the table provides a more concise look at the results of the coding of the
internal characteristics.
Also in Appendix A are non-parametric results (specifically, Kendall tau-b
correlation results – see Table 2 of Appendix A). Kendall tau-b was used because it is “a
non-parametric correlation coefficient that can be used to assess and test correlations
between non-interval scaled ordinal variables” (Bolboacă and Jäntschi 2006, p 192). The
correlations were calculated to see if there were any relationships between variables (i.e.,
to see if any of the economic, demographic, internal characteristics, or external
characteristic variables influenced the total scores from the public participation plan
evaluations).
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The analysis revealed that none of the regional demographics correlated in a
statistically significant way with any of the public participation plan characteristics (see
Table 2 of Appendix A). In fact, there was only one set of variables correlated with
statistical significance: the total score of the public participation plans correlated with the
guidelines for outreach (Kendall T = 0.68, p > 0.026 at the 95% confidence level). If the
confidence level is set at 90%, then the total score of the public participation plans was
correlated with the types of communication that affected public participation (Kendall T
= 0.56, p > 0.07). These results comport with the coding, which revealed that the only
major differences in the public participation plans were the outreach and communication
that affected public participation.
While the statistical analysis only revealed two relationships between variables,
the participation plan analysis revealed that perhaps the “consensus-based” planning that
Georgia intended to pursue for its water planning was limited in its public participation
scope. In examining the public participation plans, it appears the plans actually limited
public participation opportunities and staging by only allowing public input through
commenting and only allowing public statements at specific times during both meetings
and commenting periods – see Figure 7. In addition, the public was not designated
(through the participation plans) to be a part of decision-making. Only further analysis
(of the participation itself) will reveal if there were other ways in which the public took
part in the water planning process; this analysis will be conducted in the next section.

93

Figure 7: Opportunities for public participation in water planning process
Statewide
Water Plan

Council
formation

Regional
Councils

Planning
process

Draft
Regional
Water Plans

Planning
process

Regional
Water Plans

Public comments:
letters, emails, online,
public meetings
Public participation
plan formation

Public Participation Plans

Public and
stakeholders

In addition, this analysis revealed the “rules of the game” for communication. Figure 8
reveals how regions planned to communicate to the public and stakeholders and how the
public and stakeholders could communicate to the councils. As Figure 8 shows, “the
rules of the game” only allowed limited participation.
Figure 8: Regional council communication with public and stakeholders

Outreach (Middle
Ocmulgee and
Upper Oconee)

Websites (all
regions)

Press releases
(Lower FlintOchlockonee, Middle
Chattahoochee,
Middle Ocmulgee,
Suwanee-Satilla,
Upper Flint)

Regional
Councils

Communication

Public and
stakeholders
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Public comments:
letters, emails,
online comments,
public meetings

Overall, the main findings of the public participation plan analysis revealed that
all the plans stated that input from the public will be considered and incorporated into
planning products, but with the exception of that statement, there were not clear
instructions on how that would happen during the planning process. As scholars have
shown, other views should be considered in the planning process, but without clear
mandates, there is no guarantee this will occur (Margerum 2011; Norton 2005). In
addition, according to the plans, the public had no role other than providing comments (at
specific times) or attending public meetings (and speaking at specific times at the
meetings). While the plans had clear objectives to include the public and to tailor input
to the collaborative, GA EPD did not consider the quality of the public forums in
developing their guidance (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003). As previously
discussed, public meetings and commenting periods often suffer from lack of deliberation
among the public and a lack of accountability by the policymakers, so other forums may
have been more suitable for better involving the public (Beierle 1999; Adams 2004).
In terms of information-sharing, the public was allowed to submit comments in
writing and in person (at meetings), but there were limited ways of providing information
from councils to the public. Information-sharing from the councils to the public and
stakeholders was mainly limited to websites, with a few regions also using press releases
to disseminate information. It was also concerning that only two of the ten participation
plans even discuss public outreach. These findings about the lack of information-sharing
and outreach confirm concerns about the extent to which planning and policymaking is

95

truly collaborative without them (Beierle 1999; Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003;
Margerum 2011).
The analysis revealed a relationship between the total plan scores and the outreach
and communication (related to public participation), but the regions’ populations, median
household income, and percentage of total population in poverty had no relationship with
any of the public participation plan variables. These findings reveal that the differences in
the income levels, poverty, or population had no effect on plan quality.
While the rules for participation limited how the public could take part in the
planning process, the procedures for participation were clear in the plan. This analysis
revealed that creating public participation plans does not necessarily mean that a
collaborative and participatory process will take place. The plans must provide
meaningful opportunities for participation (Beierle 1999; Brody, Godschalk, and Burby
2003; Margerum 2011).
Using these findings on the public participation plans, formal modes of public
participation (meeting summaries, public comments, etc.) will be examined in the next
section to determine how closely the regions used the public participation plans to guide
public input. In addition, the last section of the study synthesizes all the findings from
this study to show how the public participation plans influenced the public’s role and the
ways in which the public provided input in the process.
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VI.

Results – Hypothesis 2
As introduced previously in this study, the second hypothesis states the following:

Assuming the participation plans established rules to foster public input, an analysis of
formal communications and secondary sources demonstrates a legitimately collaborative
process occurred in each region. In order to gauge the collaborative nature of the water
planning process, documentation from meetings and commenting periods was reviewed,
coded, and analyzed. The remainder of this section includes the findings from this
analysis.

A. Lack of Public Participation Documentation

A1. Data Availability
The Georgia State Water Plan website and each respective region’s site provided
the information examined in this study (a link for each region’s website is located on the
homepage of the Georgia State Water Plan website: www.georgiawaterplanning.org).
Table 19 shows a typical schedule for the public involvement in the regional water
planning process. With a few exceptions (for example, no summaries were available for
Council Meeting #11 for the Altamaha or Coastal Georgia regions), documentation was
available for the items listed in Table 19; however, there were times that this
documentation was not complete (this issue will be discussed in more detail in this
section).
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Table 19: Public Involvement Opportunities in the Georgia Water Planning Process
Year
May – December 2009
January – February 2010

March 2010
January – December 2010

May and June 2011
January – December 2011

Public Involvement Opportunity
Attend and Make Comments at Council
Meetings (usually 4 meetings during the
year)
Attend and Make Comments at Joint
Council Meetings (i.e., meetings between
several of the councils)
Submit comments on Resource
Assessments
Attend and Make Comments at Council
Meetings (usually 4 meetings during the
year)
Submit comments during public
commenting period on draft water plans
Attend and Make Comments at Council
Meetings (usually 2-3 meetings during the
year)

Each region held “other” meetings (such as “Local Government and Utility”
meetings and “Plan Review and Technical Subcommittee” meetings), but two issues
arose in researching them: 1) it was unclear if the public was invited and involved in
these meetings; and, 2) only four of the ten regions provided any of these “other” meeting
summaries on their websites (i.e., meetings other than council or joint-council meetings).
In the planning process, there may have been outreach or subcommittee meetings (for
example), but there is not consistent (or available) documentation of these meetings. The
inconsistent documentation of (and access to) these meetings could possibly be attributed
to the fact that the public participation plans only guaranteed public access to regional
council meetings. Thus, the only meetings analyzed in this study are those listed in Table
19.
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A2. Regional Plan Contractors
In addition to issues with documenting meetings in the regional water planning
process, there were problems with consistency and quality of the available documentation
discussed in Table 19. The contractors who worked for the councils did not document
public meetings in the same way. As a GA EPD staff member replied in an email,
“thorough research of these Council activities has revealed some areas where we are
simply missing information from past contractors, and that information may just not be
available several years later” (GA EPD 2014). When missing documentation was
requested from contractors, only one contractor responded; the response was that there
was no additional documentation outside of what was listed on the water planning
websites.
Of the 109 council meetings that convened during the water planning process, 28
(or 25.69 percent) of the meeting summaries did not include meeting attendance. Of the
meeting summaries that did not include meeting attendance, 53.5 percent of them were
managed by the same contractor – see Table 20 for the number of known attendees at
regional council meetings and the number of attendance lists that were not included in
meeting summaries. Meeting attendance is useful in determining who was involved in
the process and which political and interorganizational networks were engaged.
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Table 20: Number of Attendees and Missing Attendance Lists for Council Meetings
Number of
Council
Meetings

# Known
attendees at
Council
meetings

# Missing
Attendance Lists
for Council
Meetings

Water Region

Contractor

Altamaha

Contractor A

11

101

1

Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee

Contractor A
Contractor B
Contractor C
Contractor C

171
20
63
85

1
10
5
5

Middle Ocmulgee

Contractor D

167

0

Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor D
Contractor A
Contractor C
Contractor B

11
11
11
11
11
10
11
11
11

123
149
72
164

0
1
5
0

When a council meeting summary provided an attendance list, many lists showed
the person’s name and affiliation, but the list almost never recorded contact information.
Because contact information was not included, it is difficult to assume that the councils
communicated with these participants outside of meetings. All ten regions, however,
indicated in their 2011 public participation overview memorandums that they had email
lists (each memorandum is available on the respective water planning websites as
supplemental information). Most contractors indicated that they either chose people to be
on the email lists or added people when they requested to be on the list. But, there was
not a clear way to sign up for these email lists (or know of their existence) as the public
participation plans did not discuss them. Also, only a few of the regions provided the list
of people on their email lists in the public participation overview memorandums.
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Overall, the lack of contact information of meeting participants raises concerns
about the following: 1) Communication with people who are interested in participating in
the process – there was not a clear way to receive information about meetings unless a
person checked the website. 2) Information-sharing with people who wanted to
participate – once again, unless a person checked the website, there was not a way to
receive information from the councils. 3) The public’s role in the process – if councils
and their respective contractors did not gather contact information for interested
participants, the public’s role in the process is questionable.

B. Overview of Commenters
Because there was inconsistent and unavailable information about the people who
attended public meetings, the proxy for participation in this study is the people who made
or submitted comments (i.e., the “commenters”). There were approximately166 different
individuals or organizations known to have made comments during one or more of the
following times: regional council meetings, joint council meetings, the draft resource
commenting period, or the draft regional water plan commenting period. There were
times when different individuals from the same organization made comments throughout
the process – each individual submitting comments was treated separately in this count
even if they belonged to the same organization. At other times, a comment would be
submitted on behalf of an organization (without an individual’s name), and later, an
individual from that same organization would submit a comment. These were also
treated separately in this count (i.e., the organization was treated as “one” commenter and
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the individual from that same organization was treated as “one” commenter because they
both submitted comments during the planning process).
In addition to the approximately 166 commenters, there were 23 other individuals
who made comments but were not associated with any identifiable information (i.e., their
identities were “unknown” in the available records). In all cases for the 23 “unknown”
entities, their identities were not acknowledged in council meeting summaries. Thus, in
every case of the 23 “unknown” identities, regional planning contractors failed to identify
who was speaking or making a comment at the council meetings.
Of the 166 different individuals and organizations who commented, at least 16 of
them commented in more than one forum (for example, some individuals commented at
both regional council meetings and draft resource commenting period). In addition to the
individuals who submitted comments at more than one forum, there were many
individuals who spoke at multiple regional council meetings. Figure 9 shows the types of
organizations for the 166 different individuals and organizations. Three important
considerations to note for the organization types: 1) the “Interest group” type also
included business interest groups, so the “Business” category’s participation may seem
misleadingly low. 2) Also, the “Unknown” organization type includes individuals whose
names were available but their affiliations were not. Thus, some of the “Unknown”
individuals may have been members of the general public. 3) The 23 “unknown” entities
mentioned earlier, whose names and affiliations were unknown, are not included in the
figure below.
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Figure 9: Organization Types for Commenters

As seen in Figure 9, interest groups (34.9%) and government-affiliated
individuals (33.7%) were the most likely groups to provide comments at meetings and
during public commenting periods. Interestingly, there were at least two council
members who submitted comments during public commenting periods (council members
were not considered commenters at council meetings since they were the individuals
overseeing the water planning process and managing the meetings). The “unknown”
category only made up of 14.5% of the known participants (this category included
members of general public). While there is no particular percentage of the general public
that must be involved in the planning process, certainly planning facilitators could make
an effort to ensure the general public participates.
As this study was originally proposed, there was an expectation to examine which
social, interorganizational, and political networks attempted to influence the process.
Because of the missing data on participants, roughly 24% of the commenters’
social/political/organizational affiliations are unknown (i.e., the data shows what

103

commenters said but not necessarily who they were). Due to this disparity, the rest of
this analysis treats the commenters as one group of participants. This study was able to
analyze the issues that participants had with the process but was not able to differentiate
issues based on network and group affiliation. Future studies on Georgia’s water
planning (and water planning as a whole) should find ways to account for networks in
analysis through better data. As discussed previously, had the contractors collected
names and affiliations (as well as contact information), more could be known about the
networks that participated in Georgia. In the future, minimum documentation
requirements for water planning could alleviate concerns about missing information –
and in this case, missing data about group affiliation.

C. Comment Counts and Findings

C1. Count Data and Participation Themes
While more members of the general public could have been involved in the water
planning process, this study is mainly concerned with the collaborative nature of the
process itself. This section explores the concerns and themes that arose during an
examination of the public participation in council meetings and commenting periods.
The remainder of this analysis discusses the participation themes and the analyses
of their associated count data. As previously discussed, count data are particularly useful
because the results allow a researcher to identify the number of times something occurs
(this study is concerned with the counts of commenting on particular concerns) (Cameron
and Trivedi 2013). The concerns discussed in the remainder of this section derived from
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the content analysis. The methods used for the content analysis and count data were
discussed in more depth in Section IV, Part B.
There were many themes and associated codes derived from the content analysis –
Appendix B lists a complete list of codes. This study, however, is only discussing the
codes and themes that affected public participation in some way – see Table 21. All the
codes and related findings are discussed in greater depth throughout this section.
Table 21: Codes Affecting Public Participation (Dependent Variables)
Code
Number*

Code Label

1

Process - Council

6

Process Information

7

Process - Public

9
12
21
23

Process Geography
Process - Offer to
provide info
Plans implementation
Process - other
states

Code Meaning
Process –Issues related to Council Communication,
Facilitation, and Representation
Process –Issues related to Information-sharing
Process – Issues related to public and stakeholder
roles and participation in planning process
Process – Problems arising from geographic
boundary disputes
Process - Offer to provide information to council**
Plans – Concern about plan implementation

Process –Concerns about working with other states
Process - Concerns about GA EPD Engagement,
37
Process - EPD
Communication, and Process Facilitation
Plans - conflict
Plans – Plans and Assessments conflict with other
45
with other policies existing policies
48
Plan - Atlanta
Plan/Process–Problems related to Atlanta
Count of how many public participants submitted
comments at each council meeting, joint council
meeting, resource assessment commenting period,
and draft plan commenting period. Individuals were
None
Total Commenters
counted only once per meeting (however an
individual could be counted more than once if they
attended multiple meetings) and once per
commenting period
*See Appendix B for complete codebook
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**Only applies to Regional Council Meetings (not the Commenting periods)
Statistical modeling was used to see if the counts for coded concerns (dependent
variables) could be explained by the following independent variables: by region, by
consultant, the score on the Public Participation Plan (derived from Hypothesis 1), the
Total 2011 population for each region, the Median 2011 population for each region, the
Median Household Income for each region, and the Percentage of Total Population in
Poverty (Median) for each region. See Table 22 for the independent variables used in the
study. Also, see Appendix D for the raw data (and counts) for each of the independent
and dependent variables.
Table 22: Independent Variables for Statistical Analysis
Independent Variables
Region
Consultant

Score on PPP
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
Percentage of Total Population in
Poverty (Median)

Explanation of Variables
Region label (Coastal Georgia, Upper Flint, etc).
Consultant associated with region (for example,
Consultant A, B, C, D) – actual company names
were not used
Score on the public participation plan (discussed
in Hypothesis 1 results)
Total 2011 population per water planning region
Median 2011 population per water planning
region
Median household income per water planning
region
Percentage of total population in poverty
(median) per water planning region

To analyze count data as dependent variables, generalized linear models were run
using both Poisson and negative binomial distributions (Agresti 1996; Hilbe 2011;
Cameron and Trivedi 2013). The negative binomial distribution is often used when
overdispersion is present in a Poisson model (Hilbe 2011). Overdispersion was present in
many of the Poisson regressions in this study.
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Poisson regressions were run for each of the counts associated with the codes in
Table 21. With one exception (which will be discussed later in this section), the models
were either a very poor fit, the data did not converge, or the independent variables were
insignificant. To account for overdispersion, several negative binomial regressions were
also modeled – see Appendix F for an example. The negative binomial regressions were
also unsuccessful for modeling the data. Nonlinear models do not always converge for a
particular data set (Dobson 2001; McCulloch and Neuhaus 2001). This is true for these
sets of models. The possible (and most likely) cause of the poor model fit was the low
number of observations (n = 10). Because there were only 10 regions, the regressions
only had 10 observations to model.
The other likely issue in the modeling was the correlation within each of the
coded variables. For instance, in the variable where counts were recorded for individuals
who discussed regional council issues (Code 1), some individuals discussed problems
with specific councils (for example, the Coastal Georgia Council) while other individuals
would discuss a subset or all of the councils. If an individual only talked about the
Coastal Georgia Council, then only one “count” was recorded for Coastal Georgia.
When an individual discussed all the councils, one “count” for each region was recorded.
While this was an effective way of understanding how often the public in each region
discussed councils, this made the data more difficult to model. However, even if the
counts had been done in an alternative fashion, the n of 10 regions would have still been
difficult to model.
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While model convergence was rare (with the exception of one Poisson model
discussed later in this section), a correlation matrix shows the relationships between the
variables – see Appendix F. The matrix shows that some variables are correlated, but the
coefficients (r) cannot be interpreted as correlation does not imply causation. These
results present the correlations, but no inferences about those relationships are discussed.
Future studies can further investigate the correlations to see if there are any causal
relationships.

C2. Count of Total Commenters
While the study attempted to count how many different individuals and
organizations participated in public commenting, a count of how often commenting took
place was also executed. As discussed previously in Table 21, this count included the
number of public participants who submitted comments at each council meeting, joint
council meeting, resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan commenting
period. Individuals were counted only once per meeting (however, an individual could
be counted more than once if they attended multiple meetings) and once per commenting
period. See Table 23 for the count of total commenting at meetings and commenting
periods for each region.
Table 23: Count of Commenting from each Region
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C

108

Total commenters - All
45
67
55
58
63

D
D
A
C
B

Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

52
58
67
47
70

*Notes about counts:
 Meeting #2 for Savannah-Upper Ogeechee, Meetings #2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 for Upper Oconee, and
Meetings # 4, 5, and 9 for Suwannee-Satilla did not attribute some of the public comments made to any
person. Thus, the number of commenters is an estimate for these meetings.
 If a meeting summary was not available for a meeting, then the number for commenters was left blank.
This affected two meetings.
 Savannah-Upper Ogeechee had an interim meeting, which is being accounted for in the data as
meeting #6. Subsequent meetings after #6 are considered the 7th, 8th, 9th, etc meetings.

For reasons discussed previously (need for larger number of observations and correlated
count data), the Poisson regression did not show any significant difference in the number
of commenters for each region or the number of commenters associated with each
planning contractor. The correlation matrix showed positive correlations between count
of comments for each region and the score on the public participation plan for each
region (r = 0.2195), total 2011 population for each region (r = 0.4539), median 2011
population for each region (r = 0.4694), median household income for each region
(0.3821); there was a negative correlation between count of comments and the median
percentage of total population in poverty (r = -0.3110). Although the matrix shows
correlation between variables, the coefficients (r) cannot be interpreted since correlation
does not imply causation. The correlations, however, appear to reveal a relationship that
would be expected: a positive correlation between population and number of commenters
(i.e., the larger the population, the more commenters would be expected to participate).
In addition, the correlations appear to reveal a positive relationship between economic
resources for households and the amount of participation. This relationship is what
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scholars such as Laurian (2004) have found: individuals with more economic means
tended to participate more than those with less economic resources.

C3. Issues related to Council Communication, Facilitation, and Representation
One theme that resulted from the content analysis was issues related to the
communication, process facilitation, and representation of the ten regional water
councils. As shown throughout this study, communication (Margerum 2011) and process
facilitation and decision-making (Forester 1989; Beierle 1999; Margerum 2011) are
elements of an ideal public participation process. Representation on the council, in this
context, reveals whether or not stakeholder selection was inclusive for council seats
(Margerum 2011). Thus, this theme that emerged from the data deals with the public’s
role in both the formation of the regional policy collaboratives and the council’s
influence on water plan formation (the variables of interest in the theoretical model are
the regional policy collaboratives and the regional plan writing).
To show how this theme emerged, Table 24 lists some of the issues discussed by
public participants. The issues reveal the concerns public participants had and how the
concerns were integrated into a theme based on the theoretical underpinnings of this
study.
Table 24: Examples of How Issues Related to Councils Were Coded
Comment
The council needs take an active rather
than passive approach to public
involvement
Future council meetings should include
several meetings devoted solely as public
meetings

How comment relates to theme
The way councils facilitated process
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Concern about things in plan that weren't
agreed upon
Concern that council doesn't believe EPD
data
Councils were overwhelmingly white and
male; councils need to be diverse
Environmental interests not represented on
council
Items to be discussed at meetings should be
made available to the public so that they
can review prior to meeting
“I don’t know what the plan is to ensure
more people know about the meetings, but
I had to search for public notice on the
website. I suggest making the public more
aware of meetings”

The way decision-making occurred by
councils

Representation on Councils

Communication by Councils

In addition to the emergence of this theme and coding comments based on the theme,
counts were performed to reveal how often these issues surfaced in the water planning
process – see Table 25.
Table 25: Count of Comments on Council Issues from each Region
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters
13
14
14
15
14
13
14
12
14
14

In the statistical analysis of the counts, the Poisson regression did not show any
significant difference in the number of commenters (on council issues) for each region or
the number of commenters (on council issues) associated with each planning contractor.
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The correlation matrix, however, showed some interesting correlations between different
variables and count of comments (on council issues) for each region. There was a
slightly negative correlation between number of comments and the score on the public
participation (-0.1027) and median percentage of population in poverty (-0.1466) and
slightly positive correlations between number of comments and total 2011 population for
each region (r = 0.1362), median 2011 population for each region (r = 0.2397), median
household income for each region (0.0801).
From a qualitative standpoint, however, the results call into question the
collaborative nature of the water planning process in Georgia. There appears to be
evidence that there were consistent issues across all regions with regard to
communication, process facilitation, and representation of the ten regional water
councils. The discussion at the end of this section provides greater context for this issue
(i.e., at the end, there is a discussion and synthesis of meaning for all the thematic
variables as a whole).

C4. Issues related to Information-Sharing
In addition to issues related to the councils, there were also problems related to
public participants receiving information 1) late in the planning process, 2) in a timely
manner, and 3) just simply not receiving it at all. As discussed in this study, informationsharing and a two-way flow of information are important and necessary aspects of a
collaborative process that include public participation (Margerum 2011; Brody,
Godschalk, and Burby 2003).
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To demonstrate how this theme emerged, Table 26 lists some of the issues
discussed by public participants. The issues reveal the concerns public participants had
about information-sharing and how the concerns developed into a theme based on the
literature and theory synthesized in this study.
Table 26: Examples of How Information-Sharing Issues Were Coded
Comment
How comment relates to theme
Items to be discussed at meetings should be
made available to the public so that they
Timing related to sharing information
can review prior to meeting
Information about the utility energy water
forecasts was kept undisclosed for an
extended time
Assumptions and data used in model not
been provided for technical review
Missing information
Concerned that draft assessments are not
accompanied by technical and scientific
documents needed to fully evaluate them
In addition to deriving this theme, a count shows how often information-sharing
was discussed – see Table 27. In the statistical analysis of the counts, the Poisson
regression did not show any significant difference in the number of commenters (on
information-sharing) for each region or for each planning contractor. The correlation
matrix revealed very weak correlations: there was a slightly negative correlation between
number of information-sharing comments and total 2011 population for each region (0.04) and median percentage of population in poverty (-0.2183) and slightly positive
correlations between the information-sharing variable and the score on the public
participation plan for each region (r = 0.0891) and median 2011 population for each
region (r = 0.0954). The strongest of the correlations was between the informationsharing variable and median household income (r = 0.3834).
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Table 27: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed Information-Sharing
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters
14
14
13
13
15
14
12
12
13
13

From a qualitative position, however, these results also raise questions about the
collaborative nature of the water planning process in Georgia. There appears to be
evidence that there were consistent issues across all regions with regard to informationsharing.

C5. Issues related to Public and Stakeholder Roles and Participation in Planning
Process.
Another issue that emerged in the analysis was that stakeholders and other public
participants often urged the councils to consider input from particular stakeholders,
suggested ways to better communicate with the public, and expressed concerns about low
turnout from public participants in the water planning process – examples are shown in
Table 28. These issues show an overall concern about the role that the public was to play
in regional water planning.
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Table 28: Examples of How Issues Related to Public Participation Were Coded
Comment
Caution the Council to not get specific
without contacting end users – specifically
big municipalities and industries
Urged the Council to consider Flint
Riverkeeper input
New representation also needed from
scientific, academic, and conservation
communities
Outreach in newspaper is a good idea
Suggested the council provide a section on
the regional water council website to allow
posting and reading of comments
Disappointed at the low participation from
region
Made a call for more public attendance at
these meetings
Public input was limited at certain council
meetings

How comment relates to theme

Need to Target Public and Citizen Groups
(Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003)

Communication affecting public
participation
Approach to public input is tailored to the
collaborative (i.e., “forums and events are
designed to solicit public input”)
(Margerum 2011, p 108)

This category overlaps to some extent with the council theme discussed
previously. In textual analysis, overlap is “unavoidable” in categories (Dey, 2003 p 60).
But, the two themes were distinguished from one another to show specific problems with
the council (discussed previously) and overall issues with public participation.
As with the other themes discussed, the analysis included a count of the number
of times the public discussed participation-related issues – see Table 29. In the statistical
analysis of the counts, the Poisson regression did not show any significant difference in
the number of commenters for each region or for each planning contractor. As discussed
previously, this may be due to the correlation among the counts and the small number of
observations (n = 10).
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Table 29: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed Participation-Related
Issues
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters
14
13
12
16
19
16
13
15
14
14

The correlation matrix revealed several relationships between the variables: there
was a negative correlation between number of public participation-related comments and
total 2011 population for each region (-0.3407), median 2011 population for each region
(r = -0.4541), and median household income (r = -0.1113). There were positive
correlations between the public participation variable and the score on the public
participation plan for each region (r = 0.5043) and median percentage of population in
poverty (0.2625). Because these are simply correlations, no inferences can be made
about the relationships between the variables, but the correlations show that a relationship
may exist. These relationships could be examined in future studies.
Regardless of the outcome of the statistical analysis, the qualitative analysis
revealed that there were concerns among public participants about involvement,
communication, and participation opportunities. This is an important finding because
some public participants felt disconnected from the planning process – despite the fact
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that this was supposed to be a “consensus-based” planning process involving the public.
In addition, these issues developed despite the public participation plan implementation.

C6. Comments on Geographic Boundary Disputes
One of the reasons geographic boundary disputes evolved as an issue during the
regional water planning process is that the regions were based on county lines – not river
basins. Interestingly, however, the regions developed before the regional water planning
started. The regions were developed in by the Statewide Policy Collaborative (in
Georgia, this was the Water Council) during the initial statewide plan-writing – refer to
the theoretical model to see more about these variables.
The geographic boundary disputes for the regions show how decisions made at
the constitutional-level of rules can affect planning at the collective-choice level as seen
here. The boundaries also made planning difficult as regions were located in different
river basins. Organizing the regions in this way resulted in some public participants
having to go to multiple regional meetings to discuss the impacts on a particular river
basin. Examples of issues related to the regional water planning boundaries are shown in
Table 30.
Table 30: Examples of How Issues Related to Geographic Boundary Disputes Were
Coded
Comment
The Ogeechee River is in four different
Council boundaries. I’m here today
because one of our volunteers let us know
about a potential management practice
coming out of Savannah Upper Ogeechee
that the Coastal region might want to be
aware

How comment relates to theme

Regional boundaries causing planning
problems
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The fact that we need joint council
meetings indicated that the regional
planning boundaries are not a good fit
Metro Region's boundaries cause problems
in planning for all regions
Need to reconsider regional boundaries to
better reflect natural watersheds
Table 31 lists a comment count of public participants who discussed boundary issues for
each region. There were no differences in the number of commenters by region or by
contractor, according to the Poisson models. However, there were several correlations
including a negative correlation between comments made on geography and the score on
the public participation plan (r = -0.5345) and positive correlations between comments
made on geography and total 2011 population (r = 0.0794), median 2011 population (r =
0.5687), median household income (r = 0.2070), and the median percentage of total
population in poverty (r = 0.0115).
Table 31: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed Geography
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters
10
12
9
10
9
9
9
8
9
8

Although the statistical analysis did not have significant findings (other than that
this is an issue consistent throughout the regions), the qualitative analysis showed that
geographic boundary issues were a problem in the planning process. Overall, the theme
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shows the importance of careful development of planning boundaries: the boundaries not
only impact the planning process – they also impact the way the public participates in the
process.

C7. Offer to Provide Information to Council at Public Meetings
Thus far, the discussion of comments has included an analysis of comments made
during public meetings and public commenting periods. This theme, however, only
focuses on comments made during the public meetings. A mix of commenters at public
meetings offered to provide information or help to the councils. The comments made
during public commenting periods, however, almost always provided information to the
councils. The distinction is made here to see if there was a difference in the amount of
information/help offered to councils during public meetings. Examples are shown in
Table 32.
Table 32: Examples of How Comments to Provide Information Were Coded
Comment
Will attend meetings as a resource for the
council. Fishery is an important
recreational activity for the state.
Offered to provide a presentation on the
importance of the aquatic resources in the
basin and the need for adequate in-stream
flows at the next meeting
While fairly academic, the material
presented is important to the work of the
council, and I will be happy to discuss it
more with council members at any time
Discussed how extension agents can be
used to assist public with stormwater
management, water conservation, delisting
TMDLs

How comment relates to theme

Offered to provide information to council

Offered to help council/process

119

The count of public meeting comments offering information or help to councils is
provided in Table 33. Also, there are relationships between variables as shown in the
correlation matrix: total 2011 population (r = 0.2567), median 2011 population (r =
0.4089), median household income (r= 0.3009), and percentage of total population in
poverty (r = -0.1848).
Table 33: Count of Comments from each Region Who Offered to Provide Information
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters
1
7
3
7
6
5
2
9
0
11

In addition to the correlations, the results from a generalized maximum likelihood
model with a Poisson distribution and log link showed that the score on the Public
Participation Plan was statistically significant for total commenters in this theme – see
Model 2 in Appendix F for results. The correlation matrix also revealed that the score on
the Public Participation Plan and the commenters in this theme is correlated (r = 0.5204).
One of the possible reasons there is a statistically significant relationship between these
variables is that the data is not correlated (the comments were unique to the individual
regions since comments at public meetings were only counted for this variable). Overall,
there is a statistically significant relationship between commenters’ offer to provide
information/help and the score on the public participation plan. The higher the score on
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the public participation plan, the more people offered to help/provide information. Thus,
the regions with higher scores on the public participation plan had more people wanting
to provide information – this relationship does not mean that regions with higher public
participation scores had more participation at public meetings, but perhaps that the
participants felt more engaged. In future studies, this relationship could be researched
further.

C8. Concerns about Plan Implementation
Public participants at public meetings and commenting periods also voiced
concerns about the ways they would be involved with or affected by the plan
implementation – see Table 34. Implementation deals with how the regional water plans
will be executed in the future (plan implementation is a variable in the theoretical model).
One of the reasons implementation issues are important to note is that addressing these
concerns now may help applying the plan in the future; thus, it was important for the
councils to hear what problems the public had with implementation.
Table 34: Examples of How Issues Related to Plan Implementation Were Coded
Comment
Counties, cities, and water authorities need
funding to implement these plans
Plan should not be used as an advocacy
tool for a revised water control plan with a
non-peer reviewed hydrologic model
commissioned by partisan stakeholders
Concern about burden on local
governments to enforce rules that result
from plans
Concern that there is no implementation
strategy for plans
Plans should require implementation of

How comment relates to theme

Concerns about the ways implementation
may affect public and stakeholders
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education programs
Not sure how assessments will be used for
future planning
According to the Poisson models, there were no differences in the number of
commenters by region or by contractor. However, there were several relationships
revealed by the correlation matrix including a positive correlation between comments
made on implementation and the score on the public participation plan (r = 0.4666), total
2011 population (r = 0.3108), median household income (r = 0.2160). There were
negative correlations between comments made on median 2011 population (-0.2029) and
the median percentage of total population in poverty (r = -0.3507). The count of
comments discussing implementation issues is shown in Table 35. Overall, the
qualitative analysis revealed that implementation concerns were consistent across the
regions.
Table 35: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed Implementation Issues
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B
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Total commenters
12
12
14
14
16
14
15
13
13
16

C9. Concerns about Working with Other States
The qualitative analysis revealed concerns the public and stakeholders had about
working with other states. At times, these participants were from states outside of
Georgia, and they were voicing their concerns to make sure regional water councils were
thinking about impacts outside their immediate water region boundaries. Examples of
comments about working with other states are listed in Table 36.
Table 36: Examples of How Comments about Working with Other States Were Coded
Comment
The first regional meetings have occurred
in South Carolina and they have not
discussed water resource issues at this level
of detail
Councils should stay informed on the ways
Florida is beginning to discuss water
planning
Encouraged the Council to work with
Florida on water quantity and salt water
intrusion and include consideration of
potential St Mary’s River withdrawals by
Florida
Most of his region’s local news is from
Tallahassee, Florida and the news stories
claim that Georgia is stealing water from
Florida
Georgia needs to work with Alabama
No mention in plans of working with NC
DENR
The Savannah/Ogeechee River Basin
cannot be split between states. It is shared
by two states and future planning must
involve both states
Tri-State Water Wars need to be settled

How comment relates to theme

Concerns about the way planning in other
states will impact Georgia

Request for councils to work with other
states

Water planning conflicts with other states

There appeared to be some emphasis from GA EPD about ensuring councils held jointcouncil meetings to facilitate coordination of water planning activities. Based on the

123

qualitative analysis, however, there did not seem to be as much coordination between
Georgia’s councils and other states. Some of the theoretical reasons why working with
other states is important from public participation and planning perspectives are open
communication (Margerum 2011), outreach and education processes [which would
include reaching to other states] (Beierle 1999; Margerum 2011, p 108), and exploring
the positions of others, other interests, and brainstorming ideas (Margerum 2011, p 90).
The modeling did not show differences in the number of comments from each
region about working with other states – see Table 37 for counts. There was, however, a
relatively strong negative correlation between the score on the public participation plans
and working with other states (r = -0.5634). There were also negative correlations
between working with other states and total 2011 population (r = -0.1486) and median
household income (-0.3169); there were positive correlations between working with other
states and median 2011 population (r = 0.2147) and median percentage of total
population in poverty (r = 0.3881). Despite the lack of convergence in the modeling, the
qualitative analysis revealed that comments about working with other states happened
across all regions.
Table 37: Count of Comments from each Region about Working with Other States
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
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Total commenters
12
14
9
11
9
8
13
13

C
B

Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

11
10

C10. Concerns about GA EPD Engagement, Communication, and Process
Facilitation
While councils and their respective planning contractors were to facilitate the
water planning, GA EPD was to oversee the process. There were many comments about
the ways in which GA EPD engaged the public and stakeholders (particularly, the
scientific community) as well as the ways the agency communicated and facilitated the
process. Examples of comments that were coded under this theme are included in Table
38.
Table 38: Examples of How Issues Related to GA EPD Were Coded
Comment

How comment
relates to theme

EPD should effectively utilize the scientific and engineering
advisory panel
EPD needs to engage scientists
Wants EPD to clarify when draft assessments will be updated
and finalized
EPD's reluctance to allow you to hear uncensored
recommendations from WRD [Wildlife Resources Division] or
from SEAP [Scientific and Engineering Advisory Panel] can
only lead you to a single conclusion. Their leadership has
determined that the best science and engineering should not be
used to guide the council's efforts. I believe that is public policy
at its worst and I think many of you do as well.
EPD should clarify the future role of regional water management
councils, and how the regional councils' future plans will be
coordinated.
EPD needs to tell the Council what the end product is supposed
to be
EPD said they cannot rereun models due to budget constraints not acceptable
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EPD engagement

EPD communication
and process
facilitation

Like most of the other models in this part of the study, the Poisson regression did not
show any significant differences in number the comments on GA EPD by region or by
contractor – see Table 39 for counts. There were weak correlations between the variable
of comments on GA EPD and the score on the public participation plan (r= 0.0566), total
2011 population (r = -0.2410), median 2011 population (r = -0.2119), median household
income (-0.1575), and median percentage of total population in poverty (r = 0.2942).
Regardless of the results of the content analysis, the qualitative analysis and counts
revealed that concerns about GA EPD were consistent throughout the regions.
Table 39: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed GA EPD
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters
12
12
12
15
15
12
11
11
12
11

C11. Plans and Resource Assessments Conflicting with Other Existing Policies
Public participants also discussed how the plans and resource assessments
conflicted with other existing policies. This variable revealed the extent to which the
planning process involved interorganizational coordination (Berke and Godschalk 2009).
Interorganizational coordination – “integration with other plans or policies of public and
private parties” – involves vertical coordination with plans or policies at the federal, state,
and regional level and horizontal coordination with plans of local parties or jurisdictions
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(Berke and Godschalk 2009, p 231). Thus, if the planning process was properly
coordinating organizational interests’ plans and policies, then the analysis would reveal
that interorganizational coordination among all interests occurred (namely, coordination
between councils and organizations that acted as public participants in the process). In
some ways, this variable allows insight into the question, “To what extent did the
councils consider the impacts of their decisions on stakeholders’ existing policies and
plans?” This analysis revealed that this coordination did not always occur. In Table 40,
examples are shown of ways interorganizational coordination failed to take place in some
instances throughout the planning process.
Table 40: Examples of How Issues of Interorganizational Coordination Were Coded
Comment
The resource assessment ignored
authorized purposes [referring to Army
Corps reservoirs]
The resource assessments have ignored the
original authorized lake purposes
State Water Plan needs to reconcile
differences between regional plans
Adoption of GA Stormwater Management
manual should be mandatory and given
high priority
Concern about plans because plans
supersede previous DNR policy
Assimilative capacity documents (with
regard to surface water availability
assessments) ignore restorative and antidegradation requirements of Clean Water
Act
Concern about ignoring 2009 ruling on
Lake Lanier
Without integration, concern about
recurrent water shortfalls and economic
stagnation

How comment relates to theme

Vertical coordination

Horizontal coordination
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As seen in Table 40, issues of vertical coordination were much more prevalent than
issues of horizontal coordination. From the analysis, it is difficult to determine of the
vertical coordination issues came up more often because 1) more participants came from
the federal, state, and regional level or 2)if participants (regardless of organizational
level) saw more issues with vertical coordination. Regardless, there appeared to be issues
with interorganizational coordination – see Table 41 for counts.
Table 41: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed Interorganizational
Coordination
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters - All
11
11
11
12
19
12
12
11
11
12

Due to correlation among the counts and a small number of observations, the
Poisson regression did not provide a valid model for interorganizational coordination. In
addition, there were several weak correlations between the interorganizational
coordination and the score on the public participation plan (r= 0.1962), total 2011
population (r = 0.0105), median 2011 population (r = -0.3398), median household income
(0.1246), and median percentage of total population in poverty (r = -0.0732). As was the
case for many of the themes in this study, the qualitative results and quantitative count

128

showed interorganizational coordination concerns, but the statistical analysis did not
provide a model for further analysis.

C12. Problems Related to Atlanta
The last theme related to participation that was derived from the analysis was
related to Atlanta. As discussed previously, Atlanta had a very separate water planning
process from the rest of the state. The water planning for the Metropolitan North
Georgia Water Planning District (hereafter referred to as the Metro District) pre-dated the
planning for the rest of the state. And, as with the other regions, the Metro District was
developed by county boundaries – not river basin boundaries. Despite the water planning
process for both Atlanta and the rest of the state, tensions were still evident in the
analysis. Thus, public participants from the entire state commented on concerns about
the metro area; and in some cases, Metro District residents commented on the ways they
wanted to participate in the planning for the rest of the state – see Table 42 for examples.
Table 42: Examples of How Issues Related to Atlanta Were Coded
Comment
Need more information on how Atlanta
will impact regional water planning
Metro area needs to improve water quality,
since Middle Chattahoochee region will be
impacted
Concerned about the projection for
increased nutrient levels coming from
Atlanta point sources
Concern about increased sedimentation
from metro Atlanta
Draft plan relies on flawed assumptions
regarding availability of Lake Lanier for
water supply
Coosa-North Georgia plan discusses

How comment relates to theme

Concerns about Atlanta’s impacts on other
parts of the state

Concerns about the rest of the state’s
impacts on Atlanta
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changes to Lake Allatoona, and Metro
District wants to make sure all stakeholders
are a part of the discussion
The Poisson regression did not reveal a usable model for concerns related to
Atlanta. In addition, there were several weak correlations between the Atlanta variable
and the score on the public participation plan (r= -0.0576), total 2011 population (r = 0.1669), median 2011 population (r = -0.4186), median household income (-0.2175), and
median percentage of total population in poverty (r = 0.2528). Overall, the qualitative
results and quantitative count (Table 43) showed there were problems related to Atlanta
across the regions, but the regression did not provide a usable model; in addition, the
correlation matrix did not show very strong relationships between the variables.

Table 43: Count of Comments from each Region Who Discussed Atlanta
Water Region
Altamaha
Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North Georgia
Lower Flint-Ochlockonee
Middle Chattahoochee
Middle Ocmulgee
Savannah-Upper Ogeechee
Suwannee-Satilla
Upper Flint
Upper Oconee

Contractor
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
A
C
B

Total commenters - All
7
8
7
10
13
7
10
8
9
7

C13. Additional Findings about the Planning Process
During the qualitative and quantitative analyses, another concern that emerged
was the timing for the public participation plan adoption. Most regions (7 of 10) did not
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adopt their public participation plan until Council meeting number 4. Two regions did
not adopt the public participation plan until Council meeting number 5, and one adopted
the public participation plan during meeting number 3. The adoption of the public
participation plans did not occur until well into the planning process, which is concerning
because the public was to be involved in the water planning process from the beginning.
For most of the regions, the water planning process was almost halfway over before the
public participation plans were adopted. As discussed throughout this study, the timing
of when to involve the public is a crucial part of a participatory process (Chess and
Purcell1999; Duram and Brown 1999; Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Irvin and
Stansbury 2004; Tippett, Searle, Pahl-Wostl, and Rees 2005). If the State of Georgia
wanted a collaborative water planning process that involved the public, the participation
plans should have been adopted at the beginning of the process.

D. Summary
Overall, the analysis for this part of the study reveals patterns and themes across
the different regions. There were concerns raised about facilitator roles, informationsharing, the public’s role in the process, participation opportunities, plan implementation,
agency engagement, and process facilitation – to name a few of the issues. The analysis
showed that many of these issues were consistent across all the regions.
Yet, the data did little to distinguish how the regions were different from one
another. This is due, in part, to the type of analysis performed. As Ayres, Kavanaugh,
and Knafl (2003, p 873) argue, “coding works well to capture the commonalities of
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experience across cases but less well to capture the individual uniqueness within cases.”
Regardless, this study revealed the themes related to participation that emerged during
the coding and analysis, and then reintegrated them with the literature to explain how the
process developed versus the ideal. The last section of this study continues this
reintegration and synthesis.

VII.

Synthesis of Findings and Concluding Thoughts
While the State of Georgia clearly intended for public participation to be a part of

the water planning process, this analysis revealed that the public’s role was not
particularly collaborative or inclusive. In this study, the literature review, theoretical
model, and the rubric for assessing the public participation plans all illustrated what
scholars view as the “ideal” for participation. In addition, this study as a whole reveals
the complicated nature of governing water resources as many different actors are
involved in its use.
Overall, the model proposed in this study can be used as a water planning process
evaluation framework for other states. In addition, the model provided a holistic view of
how the entire process took place in Georgia; this overall outlook provided the context to
examine the state’s plan-writing and public participation. As the results of the analysis
(and discussion in the remainder of this section) show, decisions made well before the
regional plan-writing influenced how public participation took place in Georgia (i.e.,
variables in the model such as context, visioning process, and constitutional-choice rules
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[statewide plan] influenced regional plan-writing and how the public participated even
though those variables were not directly involved during the regional plan-writing).
Public participation plans were examined to reveal how the rules for participation
were to govern the social, interorganizational, and political network responses (i.e., the
public). Available participatory responses (i.e., “voice”) were analyzed to show how the
public attempted to influence plan-writing and the planning process (Laurian 2004;
Hirschman 1970). Therefore, testing the relationships between plan-writing and the
public revealed the institutions, politics, and rules that facilitated and hindered public
participation. The model as a whole provided context for the public participation during
the plan-writing while also providing a template for future examination of the other
variables.
Overall, the analysis showed the concerns that many scholars have about
regulations requiring public participation as “forced minimal inclusion” as opposed to
“proactive beneficial inclusion” (Durham and Brown 1999, p 466). While Georgia
allowed public commenting in the water planning process, the participation resembled
more of a legal requirement than an opportunity for the public to be a contributing part of
the water planning process. The examination of the water planning process in Georgia
revealed systematic issues with public participation; these issues were a result of
institutional design (at both the constitutional and collective-choice levels), facilitator
roles, power-sharing, politics, public participation structuring, and process facilitation.
These issues are further explored in the remainder of this section. In addition, this
section recommends mandates to be used in future water planning in other states.
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A. Institutional, Political, Policy, and Planning Influences on Public Participation
A1. Regional Planning Boundaries
In terms of institutional design, one area greatly influenced the planning process
and the way public participants were involved; namely, the creation of geographic
boundaries for water planning regions. Before the regional water planning occurred, the
regional planning boundaries were established. And, even before these boundaries were
established, the Metro District water planning boundaries for the Atlanta area were
established. While one can assume that the establishment of the Metro District’s
boundaries did not completely dictate the way the rest of the state was carved into
planning regions, the Atlanta area’s geography certainly had an influence since the Metro
District was established before the planning process for the rest of the state was designed.
Regardless, GA EPD and the Water Council established the ten regional water planning
boundaries based on county lines – not watersheds. And, as discussed previously,
decisions made at the constitutional-level of rules (such as geographic boundaries for
planning regions) can affect planning at the collective-choice level.
As evidenced in the public’s comments, participants were concerned about the
failure to adequately allocate water resources based on these regional boundaries. But,
there were also participation-related issues that resulted from the regional borders. There
were concerns from out-of-state participants who wanted to know how they would be
affected by the planning since the regions did not include their states. There were also
concerns from participants about the ways Atlanta’s water use would affect other regions
and the way other regions’ water use would affect the Metro District. Lastly, there were
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concerns about coordination among regions since they often shared overlapping
watersheds. From this analysis, there is evidence that planning by watershed may
alleviate some of these issues and this water planning region structuring needs careful
consideration.

A2. Facilitator Roles, Power-Sharing, Policy Decisions, and Political Influence.
In the analysis of the second hypothesis, variables such as communication,
process facilitation, and engagement were coded in conjunction with the Councils, GA
EPD, Atlanta, etc and not as stand-alone variables (i.e., “communication” versus
“Council – communication”) to show two aspects the planning process: 1)
communication, for example, does not occur in a vacuum – it is influenced by the entity
who holds the power over how it occurs; and 2) to show which entities held power in the
process. Therefore, the analysis revealed that another institutional design that affected
public participation was the role of facilitators and power-sharing among them.
The study showed that process facilitation included several entities: GA EPD, the
regional councils, and the planning contractors. As evidenced by some of the comments
examined in this analysis, there were power-sharing issues between these entities, but
particularly between GA EPD and the councils. GA EPD oversaw the entire water
planning process (and had final say in the approval of the plans), but the councils were to
manage the water planning for each region. The agency’s management of the water
planning was expected to a large degree as it was mandated by the Georgia Water Plan.
Throughout the process, however, GA EPD wielded a great deal of influence in the
councils. From providing minimum guidelines for the public participation plans to
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creating the resource assessments that were to guide councils’ decision-making, GA EPD
largely controlled the process (for other examples of GA EPD’s guidance, see GA EPD
2009). In addition, while the planning contractors were to assist the water planning
councils with the planning process, they were under contract to GA EPD (The Water
Council 2008b).
When the constitutional-level rules were formed to guide the regional water
planning process, more authority and autonomy could have been given to the councils. If
the water planning process was to result in plans that were truly unique to each region,
then the councils should have had more flexibility to create plans for their respective
regions. Since GA EPD controlled a good deal of the information provided to councils
for decision-making, there was less of an incentive (or reason) for the councils to seek
outsider and public input. For instance, if the councils purposely sought out different
scientific information (which some public participants consistently asked them to do),
this information would have likely conflicted with the technical and scientific
information (namely, the resource assessments) that EPD provided to the councils. This
conflict was evident as public participants asked both the councils and EPD to reach out
to environmental and scientific interests.
While control over the technical and scientific information was one example,
another illustration of GA EPD’s influence in the water planning process was the council
appointments. While the council members were ultimately appointed by the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, or Speaker of the House, GA EPD was one of several agencies that
submitted names of qualified individuals (The Water Council 2008b; State Water Plan
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2011). The council appointment process was inherently political as GA EPD, agencies,
and politicians chose who was to be a part of the water planning process. As many
participants stated in their comments, there were other interests (e.g., non-white, women,
environmental, scientific, etc) that the public wanted represented on the councils.
As discussed previously, understanding how planners view, manipulate, and use
power informs an analysis of the choices made during the planning process (Forester
1989; Barnes et al. 2003; Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007). As seen in Georgia,
EPD’s role and ability to exert its influence in the water planning process greatly defined
how the councils conducted water planning but also how the public was involved –
especially since GA EPD provided public participation guidance that had to be followed
at a minimum. Thus, the roles of the planning facilitators (Forester 1989; Sabatier et al.
2005; Margerum 2011) needed to be defined in constitutional-level rules in such a way to
lessen the influence of politics (to the extent possible); this could have possibly been
accomplished by giving the regional councils more authority and autonomy, allowing the
councils to choose their planning contractor, and most importantly, by allowing the
council selection process to be democratic and transparent.

A3. Public Participation Structuring and Process Facilitation
In addition to problems with power-sharing and facilitator roles, there were also
issues with how public participation was structured and facilitated. One of the major
contributing institutional structures for public input was the public participation plans.
As revealed in the analysis for Hypothesis 1, there were many elements the public
participations plans were either missing or not fully realized as compared to the ideal
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components the literature provides for collaborative processes. In addition, the mandated
template for the public participation plans gave the regions little incentive to think about
public input in different ways. Future guidelines must strike a balance between minimum
requirements without over-specification; this could be accomplished by requiring broad
categories of requirements (such as information-sharing) and providing examples for
implementation that can be altered by the regions (such as sharing information through
emails, the websites, press releases, etc.).
Many of the shortfalls found in the public participation plans were affirmed in the
comment analysis. For example, information-sharing and two-way flow of information
was a variable in the public participation plan analysis that needed improvement, and the
public commenters also discussed how information-sharing was a problem throughout the
process. In addition, the literature states that the process should be facilitated by a neutral
third party (Margerum 2011). As shown in this study, however, the meeting facilitators
were contracted by GA EPD, and GA EPD greatly influenced the way the water planning
process played out. GA EPD, the councils, and the planning contractors all facilitated the
water planning process in different ways, and this power-sharing proved difficult as
previously discussed. In addition, there were questions surrounding the planning
backgrounds for GA EPD, the councils, and the planning contractors. Although these
entities acted as planners (regardless of their planning knowledge), the state (namely, GA
EPD) should make sure that the people or groups overseeing the planning process have a
background in a facilitating a participatory approach.
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Communication with participating organizations was also an issue that needed
more attention in the public participation plans, and communication by the councils was a
problem recognized by the commenters. While there were at least two forums for the
public to participate (public meetings and commenting periods), communication about
these opportunities – particularly the public meetings – was lacking. People wanted to
provide input and participate, as shown in this analysis, but there needed to be other ways
to participate outside of commenting at public meetings and commenting periods –
particularly in the decision-making process. And, at a minimum, there needed to be
explicit explanations of how the public comments would be used in decision-making.
While opportunities, forums, and notice to allow public input were needed
(Margerum 2011), there also needed to be more social capital-building. There was no
explicit coalition or social-capital building outlined in the public participation plans.
While social capital-building at the regional level is difficult with so many actors
involved, coalitions can still be developed through building trust and creating
relationships with participants (Rydin and Pennington 2000). These relationships can be
built through outreach and involvement. This can be accomplished by decreasing the
costs of participation (for example, keep meetings short), penalizing people who do not
participate (for example, name those who do not participate), and educating the public to
understand how they will directly impact the decision-making (Rydin and Pennington
2000, p 160).
The analysis of the public participation plans revealed there needed to be more
structuring for outreach and education processes. In terms of outreach, the councils
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needed to make it easier for public notification about information and meetings. And,
outside of public meetings, there were rarely (if any) opportunities for educating the
public on the planning process. The public participation plan analysis also showed that
plans needed to target public and citizen groups (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003),
while public comments affirmed this concern by revealing that more needed to be done to
include certain stakeholder groups. Public comments also provided insight to the lack of
interorganizational coordination, as several participants were concerned about the lack of
integration of existing rules and policies with the water plans.
While there were clear ground rules for how the group operated, these rules were
not inclusive of the public (outside of commenting). There were no guidelines provided
for how the public’s views would be a part of decision-making, and public comments
indicated that Council and EPD decision-making was a concern. Because Georgia was
attempting to conduct a “consensus-based” water planning process, the public comments
raised the question of which constituents would be a part of that consensus.
In addition, the public participation plans needed structure to allow decisionmaking to be more transparent and allow the public to play a role. This could be
accomplished by taking comments throughout each part of the public meetings when new
subjects are discussed (as opposed to the end of meetings only) and discussing how the
comments could change or be considered in the decision-making.
The process also needs minimum documentation requirements so that meeting
documentation occurs in the same way across regions. In the analysis of the comments,
the ways the contractors documented meetings varied greatly. The contractors needed
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rules on how to document meetings and public participation (for example, include names,
affiliations, and contact information of participants). Yet, the level of detail recorded
should not limit the amount of documentation (i.e., standardization is needed but a
balance must be struck). Consistently documenting the process allows members of the
public (who were not able to attend a meeting, for example) to understand exactly how
input was received and integrated by the councils. In addition, the councils used advisory
committees for input, but because of the lack of documentation of the planning process,
there is difficulty in knowing who was involved (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). There was
little to no information about the affiliations of the council members (i.e., why they were
appointed) and about the advisory committee members. Had the process (specifically,
who was making decisions) been documented more transparently, there may have been
less concern from commenters about representation on the councils.
The process would have benefited from public input for public participation plan
development since they are the people governed by the rules. In addition, adopting the
public participation plans needs to occur early on in the planning process – not halfway
through the process, as was the case in Georgia. A summary of the recommended
mandates from this study is provided in Table 44. These requirements can be used to
create more viable participation in water planning and policymaking.
Table 44: Recommended Mandates for Water Planning Participation



Use watershed boundaries for planning to allow out-of-state participants to be
involved in planning
Roles of the planning facilitators to be defined to lessen the influence of politics (to
the extent possible)
o Give the regional councils more authority and autonomy
o Allow councils to choose their planning contractor
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o Allow the council selection process to be democratic and transparent
o Ensure council is representative of varied interests
o Make sure facilitators have training in processes with participatory approaches
Public participation plans and Participation facilitation
o Ensure information-sharing and two-way flows of information occur
o Decision-making needs to be transparent and include the public
o Communicate about opportunities for public participation
o Increase participation (Rydin and Pennington 2000):
 Decreasing the costs of participation (for example, keep meetings
short)
 Penalize people who do not participate (for example, name those who
do not participate)
 Educate the public to understand how they will directly impact the
decision-making
o Create opportunities for education and outreach
o Target public and citizen groups
o Interorganizational coordination needs to occur
o If public commenting is main avenue to participate, develop guidelines for
how comments will be integrated in decision-making
o Take comments throughout each part of the public meetings when new
subjects are discussed (as opposed to the end of meetings only)
o Process needs to be documented in the same way (including advisory
committee meetings)
o Allow public input for development of public participation plans
o Public participation plans needed to be adopted early on in the planning
process
Overall, this dissertation focused on Georgia because the state is embarking on a

water planning process that may be used by other states in the future. The degree to
which Georgia used a “consensus-based” water planning approach was examined by
analyzing the public participation plans and public comments submitted throughout the
planning process. And, as shown in this analysis, there are improvements that can be
made in future water planning.
This study developed a rubric to evaluate the collaborative nature of the public
participation plans as one way to gauge the extent to which the public was provided
chance to collaborate. The study also analyzed the available public comments to examine

142

the participatory nature of the process. In future studies, however, the idea of meaningful
participation needs to be explored, as this study did not directly engage participants about
their experience.
By analyzing the participation plans and the participation itself, however, this
study revealed some of the institutional barriers and politics that hindered the public from
being a larger part of the process. And, the study provided suggestions for ways to
improve upon Georgia’s current model.

143

Appendices

144

Appendix A: Hypothesis 1 Statistical Results
Table 1: Water Region by Frequency Group (table and key for column headings continues on following pages)
Region

Altamaha

Coastal Georgia

Coosa-North Georgia

Lower Flint-Ochlockonee

Middle Chattahoochee

Middle Ocmulgee

Savannah-Upper Ogeechee

Suwannee-Satilla

Upper Flint

Upper Oconee

Stats.

Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate

Other_
opinions
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.087
2.000
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.087
2.000

Info_ Comm
flow
_org
1
1
0.048 0.048
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.048 0.048
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.048 0.048
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.045 0.045
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.045 0.045
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.043 0.043
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.048 0.048
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.045 0.045
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.045 0.045
1.000 1.000
1
1
0.043 0.043
1.000 1.000

Outreach

Dispute

0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
1
0.043
1.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
2
0.087
2.000

0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000

Variables
Ground_rules_group Third_ Social_
party capital
2
1
0
0.095 0.048
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.095 0.048
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.095 0.048
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.091 0.045
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.091 0.045
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.087 0.043
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.095 0.048
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.091 0.045
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.091 0.045
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
2
1
0
0.087 0.043
0.000
2.000 1.000
0.000
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Explore
1
0.048
1.000
1
0.048
1.000
1
0.048
1.000
1
0.045
1.000
1
0.045
1.000
1
0.043
1.000
1
0.048
1.000
1
0.045
1.000
1
0.045
1.000
1
0.043
1.000

Ground_rul
es_decision
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000
0
0.000
0.000

Table 1(continued): Water Region by Frequency Group
Region

Altamaha

Coastal Georgia

Coosa-North Georgia

Lower Flint-Ochlockonee

Middle Chattahoochee

Middle Ocmulgee

Savannah-Upper Ogeechee

Suwannee-Satilla

Upper Flint

Upper Oconee

Stats.

Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate
Freq
Share
Rate

Consensus Public_
input
0
2
0.000 0.095
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.095
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.095
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.091
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.091
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.087
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.095
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.091
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.091
0.000 2.000
0
2
0.000 0.087
0.000 2.000

Facilitator_role
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.087
2.000
2
0.095
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.091
2.000
2
0.087
2.000

Variables
Objectives_pp Plan_t Collab_a Forum Stages Comm
arget pproach s_PP
_PP
_PP
2
1
2
2
1
1
0.095 0.048
0.095 0.095 0.048 0.048
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000
2
1
2
2
1
1
0.095 0.048
0.095 0.095 0.048 0.048
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000
2
1
2
2
1
1
0.095 0.048
0.095 0.095 0.048 0.048
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000
2
1
2
2
1
2
0.091 0.045
0.091 0.091 0.045 0.091
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 2.000
2
1
2
2
1
2
0.091 0.045
0.091 0.091 0.045 0.091
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 2.000
2
1
2
2
1
2
0.087 0.043
0.087 0.087 0.043 0.087
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 2.000
2
1
2
2
1
1
0.095 0.048
0.095 0.095 0.048 0.048
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000
2
1
2
2
1
2
0.091 0.045
0.091 0.091 0.045 0.091
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 2.000
2
1
2
2
1
2
0.091 0.045
0.091 0.091 0.045 0.091
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 2.000
2
1
2
2
1
1
0.087 0.043
0.087 0.087 0.043 0.043
2.000 1.000
2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000
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Totals
21
1.000
21
1.000
21
1.000
22
1.000
22
1.000
23
1.000
21
1.000
22
1.000
22
1.000
23
1.000

Key for Table headings
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP

Other opinions and other point-of-views are to be considered
Two-way flow of information/ Information-sharing procedures
Communication with participating organizations
Outreach and education processes are included
Procedures for dispute resolution
Clear ground rules for how the group operates
Process facilitated by a neutral third party
Coalition or social-capital building
Process to explore positions of others
There are clear rules in place for decision making
Group is to seek consensus (but not required it for closure)
The public is solicited for its views
Facilitator role
Objectives for public participation are clear
Plan targets which citizen groups to involve
Approach to public input is tailored to the collaborative
Techniques include the different kinds of forums for participation
Stages of public participation
Communication affecting public participation
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Table 2: Kendall tau-b correlation results
Variable
Median 2011 Pop*
Median Household Income ($)*
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)*
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Other_opinions
Other_opinions
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Info_flow
Info_flow
Info_flow
Info_flow
Comm_org
Comm_org
Comm_org
Comm_org
Comm_org
Comm_org
Outreach
Outreach
Outreach
Outreach
Outreach
Outreach
Outreach
Dispute
Dispute
Dispute
Dispute
Dispute
Dispute
Dispute
Dispute

by Variable
Total 2011 Pop*
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
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Kendall τ
0.4667
0.6444
0.4667
-0.6000
-0.4222
-0.7778
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.1085
0.3977
0.3254
-0.3977
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
0.0603
0.0095*
0.0603
0.0157*
0.0892
0.0017*
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.6977
0.1544
0.2440
0.1544
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Third_party
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Social_capital
Explore
Explore
Explore
Explore
Explore
Explore
Explore

by Variable
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org

149

Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Explore
Explore
Explore
Explore
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input

by Variable
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp

by Variable
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach

by Variable
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP

by Variable
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents

by Variable
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-0.4472
-0.3876
-0.2087
0.3876
.
.
.
-0.0485
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.1172
0.1745
0.4647
0.1745
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.8815
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Table_contents
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals

by Variable
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Visuals
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Sup_docs
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord

by Variable
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Visuals
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Vert_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord

by Variable
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Visuals
Sup_docs
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Horz_cord
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements
Req_elements

by Variable
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Visuals
Sup_docs
Vert_cord
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Visuals
Sup_docs
Vert_cord
Horz_cord
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Kendall τ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Prob>|τ|
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Variable
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score
Total_score

by Variable
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
% of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Other_opinions
Info_flow
Comm_org
Outreach
Dispute
Ground_rules_group
Third_party
Social_capital
Explore
Ground_rules_decision
Consensus
Public_input
Facilitator_role
Objectives_pp
Plan_target
Collab_approach
Forums_PP
Stages_PP
Comm_PP
Table_contents
Visuals
Sup_docs
Vert_cord
Horz_cord
Req_elements

Kendall τ
-0.1581
0.0527
0.1054
-0.0527
.
.
.
0.6860
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.5657
.
.
.
.
.
.

Warning: sample size of 10 is too small, P value suspect.

*Explanation of variables
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
Percentage of Total Population in Poverty (Median)

Total 2011 population per water planning region
Median 2011 population per water planning region
Median household income per water planning region
Percentage of total population in Poverty per water planning region

159

Prob>|τ|
0.5613
0.8465
0.6985
0.8465
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0264*
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.0736
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Appendix B: Codebook for Content Analysis
1

Process - Council issues

2

Plan - Goals unclear

3

Plan - Data Assumption Problems

4

Plan - Labeling/Wording/Missing information

5

Plan - Withdrawal assumptions

6

Process - Late information/will need more info in future

7

Process - Role of stakeholders/agencies/public

8

Plan - instream flow policy problems

9

Process - Geographic boundary problems (including planning nodes)

10

Plan - wildlife, fish, and habitat protection

11

Plan - problem with water demand projections

12

Process - Offer to help/provide information

13

Plan - reservoir concerns

14

Plan - water quality management

16

Process - need better data

17

Process - need action

18

Plan - future water permitting decisions

19

Plan/Process - sharing water/water management

20

Process - need to enforce current conservation rules

21

Plans - implementation issues/plan's future use

22

Plan - groundwater discussions/issues

23

Process - Working with other states

25

Plan - population projections

26

Process/Plan - Adaptive Management

27

Plan - need conservation and/or conservation initiatives/funding

28

Plan - education

29

Plan - unimpaired flows

33

Plan - not sustainable

34

Plan - gap issues

35

Plan - energy use

37

Process/Plan - Problems with EPD

39

Plan - water returns

40

Plan - system degradation

41

Plan - need to focus on other water bodies (tributaries, fed reservoirs)

42

Plan - water balance

43

Plan - drought discussions

44

Plan - IBTs
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45

Plan - conflict between plans and other policies

46

Plan - agricultural concerns

47

Plan - golf courses

48

Plan - Metro Atlanta impacts

49

Plan - too many options

50

Process - Were different plans really needed?

51

Plan - Aquifer Storage and Recovery

52

Plan - integration

53

Plan - Economic concerns

54

Plan - Stormwater management

55

Plan - funding concerns

56

Plan - Focus on more than just conservation

57

Plan - increase treatment capacity, encourage interconnections

58

Plan - we have plenty of water

59

Process - too technical
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Appendix C: GA EPD Regional Water Planning Guidance – Public Involvement Plan
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Appendix D: Hypothesis 2 Data for Independent and Dependent Variables

Water_Region

Contr
actor

Altamaha

A

Coastal Georgia
Coosa-North
Georgia
Lower FlintOchlockonee
Middle
Chattahoochee
Middle
Ocmulgee
SavannahUpper
Ogeechee
SuwanneeSatilla

A

Upper Flint

C

Upper Oconee

B

B
C
C
D

D
A

Sc
ore
on
PP
P
0.5
3
0.5
3
0.5
3
0.5
5
0.5
5
0.5
7

Tot
al
201
1
Pop
255
157
654
068
747
398
356
717
476
159
572
936

Med
ian
201
1
Pop
140
93
526
57
299
38
226
57
118
40
251
13

0.5
3
0.5
5
0.5
5
0.5
7

612
967
412
361
247
089
554
647

175
56.5
164
52
145
32
333
26

%
Total
Pop
in
Pove
rty
(Med
ian)

Total
comme
nters All

Total
comme
nters Code 1

Total
comme
nters Code 6

Total
comme
nters Code 7

Total
comme
nters Code 9

Total
comme
nters Code
12

Total
comme
nters Code
21

Total
comme
nters Code
23

Total
comme
nters Code
37

Total
comme
nters Code
45

Total
comme
nters Code
48

27.7

45

13

14

14

10

1

12

12

12

11

7

42383
39479
.5
31216
.5

19.6

67

14

14

13

12

7

12

14

12

11

8

18.6

55

14

13

12

9

3

14

9

12

11

7

28.5

58

15

13

16

10

7

14

11

15

12

10

37495

22.4

63

14

15

19

9

6

16

9

15

19

13

41312

19.9

52

13

14

16

9

5

14

8

12

12

7

34788
.5

23.2

58

14

12

13

9

2

15

13

11

12

10

32447

26.95

67

12

12

15

8

9

13

13

11

11

8

32842

24.1

47

14

13

14

9

0

13

11

12

11

9

39209

18.7

70

14

13

14

8

11

16

10

11

12

7

Medi
an
House
hold
Inco
me ($)
31194
.5
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Appendix E: Hypothesis 2 Correlation Matrix
Table 1: Correlation Matrix - Comment Counts(key for column/row headings is below this table)
Scor Tota Medi Median Percent
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
e on
l
an Househ
age of comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment
PPP 2011 2011
old
Total ers - All
ers ers ers ers ers ers ers ers ers ers Pop Pop Income Populati
Code 1
Code 6
Code 7
Code 9 Code 12 Code 21 Code 23 Code 37 Code 45 Code 48
($)
on in
Poverty
(Median
)
Score on 1.00
- 0.1704 -0.1703
0.2195
-0.1027
0.0891
0.5043
-0.5345
0.5204
0.4666
-0.5634
0.0566
0.1962
-0.0576
PPP
00 0.13 0.093
67
0
Total
- 1.00 0.620 0.8075 -0.8002
0.4539
0.1362
-0.0400
-0.3407
0.0794
0.2567
0.3108
-0.1486
-0.2410
0.0105
-0.1669
2011
0.13
00
1
Pop
67
Median
- 0.62 1.000 0.7171 -0.6062
0.4694
0.2397
0.0954
-0.4541
0.5687
0.4089
-0.2029
0.2147
-0.2119
-0.3398
-0.4186
2011
0.09
01
0
Pop
30
Median
0.17 0.80 0.717 1.0000 -0.9305
0.3821
0.0801
0.3834
-0.1113
0.2070
0.3009
0.2160
-0.3169
-0.1575
0.1246
-0.2175
Househo
04
75
1
ld
Income
($)
Percenta
- -0.9305 1.0000
-0.3110
-0.1466
-0.2183
0.2625
0.0115
-0.1848
-0.3507
0.3881
0.2942
-0.0732
0.2528
ge of
0.17 0.80 0.606
Total
03
02
2
Populati
on in
Poverty
(Median)
Total
0.21 0.45 0.469 0.3821 -0.3110
1.0000
0.0251
-0.1307
0.1144
-0.0847
0.8816
0.3941
0.2196
-0.0571
0.2308
0.1507
comment
95
39
4
ers - All
Total
- 0.13 0.239 0.0801 -0.1466
0.0251
1.0000
0.1280
-0.0134
0.3376
-0.0642
0.3446
-0.1350
0.5328
0.1991
0.4004
comment 0.10
62
7
ers 27
Code 1
Total
0.08
- 0.095 0.3834 -0.2183
-0.1307
0.1280
1.0000
0.5358
0.4141
-0.0426
0.0242
-0.4099
0.5564
0.5951
0.2516
comment
91 0.04
4
ers 00
Code 6
Total
0.50
- -0.1113 0.2625
0.1144
-0.0134
0.5358
1.0000
-0.1811
0.2691
0.4041
-0.4144
0.7098
0.8105
0.6613
comment
43 0.34 0.454
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ers Code 7
Total
comment
ers Code 9
Total
comment
ers Code 12
Total
comment
ers Code 21
Total
comment
ers Code 23
Total
comment
ers Code 37
Total
comment
ers Code 45
Total
comment
ers Code 48

Scor Tota Medi Median Percent
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
Total
e on
l
an Househ
age of comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment
PPP 2011 2011
old
Total ers - All
ers ers ers ers ers ers ers ers ers ers Pop Pop Income Populati
Code 1
Code 6
Code 7
Code 9 Code 12 Code 21 Code 23 Code 37 Code 45 Code 48
($)
on in
Poverty
(Median
)
07
1
- 0.07 0.568
0.53
94
7
45

0.2070

0.0115

-0.0847

0.3376

0.4141

-0.1811

1.0000

-0.1690

-0.5753

0.4312

0.2629

-0.1414

0.0098

0.52 0.25 0.408
04
67
9

0.3009

-0.1848

0.8816

-0.0642

-0.0426

0.2691

-0.1690

1.0000

0.3455

-0.0000

0.0354

0.1504

-0.0414

0.46 0.31
66
08 0.202
9

0.2160

-0.3507

0.3941

0.3446

0.0242

0.4041

-0.5753

0.3455

1.0000

-0.5367

0.2206

0.6347

0.4549

- 0.214 -0.3169
0.56 0.14
7
34
86

0.3881

0.2196

-0.1350

-0.4099

-0.4144

0.4312

-0.0000

-0.5367

1.0000

-0.3346

-0.4098

-0.0284

0.05
- -0.1575
66 0.24 0.211
10
9

0.2942

-0.0571

0.5328

0.5564

0.7098

0.2629

0.0354

0.2206

-0.3346

1.0000

0.6520

0.6921

0.1246

-0.0732

0.2308

0.1991

0.5951

0.8105

-0.1414

0.1504

0.6347

-0.4098

0.6520

1.0000

0.8104

- -0.2175
0.05 0.16 0.418
76
69
6

0.2528

0.1507

0.4004

0.2516

0.6613

0.0098

-0.0414

0.4549

-0.0284

0.6921

0.8104

1.0000

0.19 0.01
62
05 0.339
8
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Key for column/row headings – Correlation Matrix*
Score on PPP
Total 2011 Pop
Median 2011 Pop
Median Household Income ($)
Percentage of Total Population in Poverty (Median)
Total commenters - All

Total commenters - Code 1

Total commenters - Code 6

Total commenters - Code 7

Total commenters - Code 9

Total commenters - Code 12

Total commenters - Code 21

Score on the public participation plan (discussed in Hypothesis 1 results)
Total 2011 population per water planning region
Median 2011 population per water planning region
Median household income per water planning region
Percentage of total population in Poverty per water planning region
Count of commenting per region (includes count of commenters at each
council meeting, joint council meeting, draft resource assessment
commenting period, and draft plan commenting period)
Count of commenting per region about councils (includes count of
commenters at each council meeting, joint council meeting, draft
resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan commenting
period)
Count of commenting per region about information-sharing (includes
count of commenters at each council meeting, joint council meeting,
draft resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan
commenting period)
Count of commenting per region about public’s role in process (includes
count of commenters at each council meeting, joint council meeting,
draft resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan
commenting period)
Count of commenting per region about planning/geographic boundaries
(includes count of commenters at each council meeting, joint council
meeting, draft resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan
commenting period)
Count of commenting per region about providing information to
councils/helping the councils (includes count of commenters at each
council meeting)
Count of commenting per region about water plan implementation
(includes count of commenters at each council meeting, joint council
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meeting, draft resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan
commenting period)
Total commenters - Code 23
Count of commenting per region about working with other states
(includes count of commenters at each council meeting, joint council
meeting, draft resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan
commenting period)
Total commenters - Code 37
Count of commenting per region about issues with GA EPD (includes
count of commenters at each council meeting, joint council meeting,
draft resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan
commenting period)
Total commenters - Code 45
Count of commenting per region about water planning conflicts with
other policies/plans (includes count of commenters at each council
meeting, joint council meeting, draft resource assessment commenting
period, and draft plan commenting period)
Total commenters - Code 48
Count of commenting per region about Atlanta (includes count of
commenters at each council meeting, joint council meeting, draft
resource assessment commenting period, and draft plan commenting
period)
*All of these variables are discussed in more detail in the study
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Appendix F: Hypothesis 2 Models
Mode1 1: Negative binomial distribution (Water Region versus Total Commenters –
Code 48)
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Model 2: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 12 versus Score on PPP
Response: Total commenters - Code 12
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Regression Plot

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced
Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

-LogLikelihood
2.97121823
26.1436219
29.1148401

L-R ChiSquare
5.9424

DF
1

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

16.9658
21.6240

8
8

0.0305*
0.0057*

Prob>ChiSq
0.0148*
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AICc
58.0015

Effect Tests
Source
Score on PPP

DF
1

L-R ChiSquare
5.9424365

Prob>ChiSq
0.0148*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Score on PPP

Estimate
-10.63459
22.355986

Std Error
5.0536281
9.165282

L-R ChiSquare
4.4665199
5.9424365

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted
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Prob>ChiSq
0.0346*
0.0148*

Lower CL
-20.66262
4.4012205

Upper CL
-0.7722
40.474784

NOTE: Poisson regressions were run for each of the counts associated with the codes in Table 20. The models were either a
very poor fit, the data did not converge, or the independent variables were insignificant. The remaining models in this
appendix are shown here to show how the models did not converge for the various variables. The variables are modeled to
compare across water regions, but there were other independent variables (total population, percent poverty, etc) that were
tested that also did not converge in models with the count data.
Model 3: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 1 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 1
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced
Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

-LogLikelihood
0.2259027
22.3290089
22.5549116

L-R ChiSquare
0.4518

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
1.0000

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
0.4518054

Prob>ChiSq
1.0000

AICc
-155.3420*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9
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Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

2.61572
-0.050771
0.0233374
0.0233374
0.0923302
0.0233374
-0.050771
0.0233374
-0.130813
0.0233374

0.0855814
0.2624169
0.2539036
0.2539036
0.2462875
0.2539036
0.2624169
0.2539036
0.2720126
0.2539036

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted
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L-R
ChiSquare
454.40133
0.0380064
0.0083904
0.0083904
0.1368415
0.0083904
0.0380064
0.0083904
0.2407243
0.0083904

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.8454
0.9270
0.9270
0.7114
0.9270
0.8454
0.9270
0.6237
0.9270

2.4431407
-0.609332
-0.514864
-0.514864
-0.427774
-0.514864
-0.609332
-0.514864
-0.712492
-0.514864

2.7788808
0.4278735
0.4881138
0.4881138
0.5446313
0.4881138
0.4278735
0.4881138
0.3633648
0.4881138

Model 4: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 6 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 6
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
0.30367036
22.1797323
22.4834027

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
0.6073

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9999

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
0.6073407

Prob>ChiSq
0.9999

AICc
-155.6405*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.5854833
0.053574
0.053574
-0.020534
-0.020534
0.1225669

0.0869087
0.254354
0.254354
0.2628528
0.2628528
0.2467518
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L-R
ChiSquare
434.70417
0.0436756
0.0436756
0.0061401
0.0061401
0.238219

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.8345
0.8345
0.9375
0.9375
0.6255

2.4101438
-0.485356
-0.485356
-0.579796
-0.579796
-0.398294

2.7511004
0.5194066
0.5194066
0.4591383
0.4591383
0.5759509

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

0.053574
-0.100577
-0.100577
-0.020534

0.254354
0.2724331
0.2724331
0.2628528

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted
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L-R
ChiSquare
0.0436756
0.1405226
0.1405226
0.0061401

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.8345
0.7078
0.7078
0.9375

-0.485356
-0.682926
-0.682926
-0.579796

0.5194066
0.3946
0.3946
0.4591383

Model 5: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 7 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 7
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
1.20676048
22.6121779
23.8189383

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
2.4135

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9831

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
2.413521

Prob>ChiSq
0.9831

AICc
-154.7756*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.6729644
-0.033907
-0.108015
-0.188058
0.0996243
0.2714746

0.0834124
0.2531807
0.2617176
0.271338
0.238658
0.2215015
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L-R
ChiSquare
480.93966
0.0181181
0.1760202
0.5091928
0.1693265
1.394463

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.8929
0.6748
0.4755
0.6807
0.2377

2.5048264
-0.570933
-0.665447
-0.768656
-0.403007
-0.19104

2.8320571
0.4291838
0.3689885
0.3045269
0.5388584
0.6822145

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

0.0996243
-0.108015
0.0350858
-0.033907

0.238658
0.2617176
0.2455422
0.2531807

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted
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L-R
ChiSquare
0.1693265
0.1760202
0.0202091
0.0181181

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.6807
0.6748
0.8870
0.8929

-0.403007
-0.665447
-0.4838
-0.570933

0.5388584
0.3689885
0.4856585
0.4291838

Model 6: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 9 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 9
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
0.62541309
20.3976305
21.0230436

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
1.2508

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9986

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
1.2508262

Prob>ChiSq
0.9986

AICc
-159.2047*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.2235083
0.0790768
0.2613984
-0.026284
0.0790768
-0.026284

0.1043498
0.3014778
0.278488
0.3158762
0.3014778
0.3158762
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L-R
ChiSquare
240.17077
0.0672422
0.8199418
0.0069781
0.0672422
0.0069781

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.7954
0.3652
0.9334
0.7954
0.9334

2.0116764
-0.569304
-0.330601
-0.710519
-0.569304
-0.710519

2.4212219
0.6252931
0.7709771
0.542589
0.6252931
0.542589

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

-0.026284
-0.026284
-0.144067
-0.026284

0.3158762
0.3158762
0.3329998
0.3158762

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted

182

L-R
ChiSquare
0.0069781
0.0069781
0.1956309
0.0069781

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.9334
0.9334
0.6583
0.9334

-0.710519
-0.710519
-0.871498
-0.710519

0.542589
0.542589
0.451466
0.542589

Model 7: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 21 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 21
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
0.67789408
22.384969
23.0628631

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
1.3558

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9981

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
1.3557882

Prob>ChiSq
0.9981

AICc
-155.2301*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.6270112
-0.142105
-0.142105
0.0120462
0.0120462
0.1455776

0.0852329
0.2719031
0.2719031
0.2537863
0.2537863
0.2393003
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L-R
ChiSquare
456.12476
0.2853122
0.2853122
0.002245
0.002245
0.3550752

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.5932
0.5932
0.9622
0.9622
0.5513

2.4551222
-0.723606
-0.723606
-0.525963
-0.525963
-0.358109

2.7895008
0.3518181
0.3518181
0.4765525
0.4765525
0.5862976

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

0.0120462
0.081039
-0.062062
-0.062062

0.2537863
0.2461666
0.2623035
0.2623035

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted

184

L-R
ChiSquare
0.002245
0.1058619
0.0570355
0.0570355

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.9622
0.7449
0.8112
0.8112

-0.525963
-0.438866
-0.620438
-0.620438

0.4765525
0.5330633
0.4163194
0.4163194

Model 8: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 23 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 23
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
1.65100736
21.1805621
22.8315695

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
3.3020

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9511

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
3.3020147

Prob>ChiSq
0.9511

AICc
-157.6389*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.3826129
0.1022937
0.2564444
-0.185388
0.0152824
-0.185388

0.0968322
0.2757592
0.2579134
0.3134731
0.2865375
0.3134731

185

L-R
ChiSquare
290.103
0.133626
0.9214554
0.3703901
0.0028318
0.3703901

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.7147
0.3371
0.5428
0.9576
0.5428

2.1864003
-0.485349
-0.288233
-0.865906
-0.598612
-0.865906

2.5664189
0.6054011
0.7306597
0.3776334
0.5356696
0.3776334

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

-0.303171
0.1823365
0.1823365
0.0152824

0.3307212
0.2662986
0.2662986
0.2865375

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted

186

L-R
ChiSquare
0.9253815
0.4454487
0.4454487
0.0028318

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.3361
0.5045
0.5045
0.9576

-1.027127
-0.382452
-0.382452
-0.598612

0.2867471
0.6701712
0.6701712
0.5356696

Model 9: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 37 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 37
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
0.78573975
21.7750898
22.5608295

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
1.5715

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9966

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
1.5714795

Prob>ChiSq
0.9966

AICc
-156.4498*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.503432
-0.018525
-0.018525
-0.018525
0.2046183
0.2046183

0.0907043
0.2736676
0.2736676
0.2736676
0.2481141
0.2481141
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L-R
ChiSquare
378.62679
0.0046076
0.0046076
0.0046076
0.6423037
0.6423037

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.9459
0.9459
0.9459
0.4229
0.4229

2.3201632
-0.602843
-0.602843
-0.602843
-0.318461
-0.318461

2.6760454
0.4795871
0.4795871
0.4795871
0.6611849
0.6611849

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

-0.018525
-0.105537
-0.105537
-0.018525

0.2736676
0.2845251
0.2845251
0.2736676

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted

188

L-R
ChiSquare
0.0046076
0.1420681
0.1420681
0.0046076

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.9459
0.7062
0.7062
0.9459

-0.602843
-0.71626
-0.71626
-0.602843

0.4795871
0.4100094
0.4100094
0.4795871

Model 10: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 45 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 45
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
1.92891369
21.6961816
23.6250953

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
3.8578

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9205

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
3.8578274

Prob>ChiSq
0.9205

AICc
-156.6076*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.4873542
-0.089459
-0.089459
-0.089459
-0.002448
0.4570848

0.0916794
0.2848375
0.2848375
0.2848375
0.2739923
0.2247451

189

L-R
ChiSquare
366.434
0.1013441
0.1013441
0.1013441
7.9854e-5
3.6761861

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.7502
0.7502
0.7502
0.9929
0.0552

2.3020139
-0.700674
-0.700674
-0.700674
-0.58728
-0.010818

2.6617358
0.4268402
0.4268402
0.4268402
0.4964421
0.8752666

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

-0.002448
-0.002448
-0.089459
-0.089459

0.2739923
0.2739923
0.2848375
0.2848375

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted

190

L-R
ChiSquare
7.9854e-5
7.9854e-5
0.1013441
0.1013441

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.9929
0.9929
0.7502
0.7502

-0.58728
-0.58728
-0.700674
-0.700674

0.4964421
0.4964421
0.4268402
0.4268402

Model 11: Generalized Linear Model Fit: Total Commenters – Code 48 versus Water Region
Generalized Linear Model Fit
Response: Total commenters - Code 48
Distribution: Poisson
Link: Log
Estimation Method: Maximum Likelihood
Observations (or Sum Wgts) = 10

Whole Model Test
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
1.87606406
19.9450542
21.8211182

Goodness Of Fit
Statistic
Pearson
Deviance

L-R ChiSquare
3.7521

DF
9

Prob>ChiSq
0.9270

ChiSquare

DF

Prob>ChiSq

0.0000
0.0000

0
0

.
.

L-R ChiSquare
3.7521281

Prob>ChiSq
0.9270

AICc
-160.1099*

Effect Tests
Source
Water_Region

DF
9

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Water_Region[Altamaha]
Water_Region[Coastal Georgia]
Water_Region[Coosa-North Georgia]
Water_Region[Lower Flint-Ochlockonee]
Water_Region[Middle Chattahoochee]

Estimate

Std Error

2.1309868
-0.185077
-0.051545
-0.185077
0.1715983
0.4339626

0.1099756
0.3555001
0.3348054
0.3555001
0.303471
0.2713542

191

L-R
ChiSquare
198.63364
0.2869843
0.0240703
0.2869843
0.3046783
2.2854706

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

<.0001*
0.5922
0.8767
0.5922
0.5810
0.1306

1.9071035
-0.968335
-0.781712
-0.968335
-0.479881
-0.138931

2.3388426
0.4467239
0.5484838
0.4467239
0.7226748
0.9337746

Term
Water_Region[Middle Ocmulgee]
Water_Region[Savannah-Upper Ogeechee]
Water_Region[Suwannee-Satilla]
Water_Region[Upper Flint]

Estimate

Std Error

-0.185077
0.1715983
-0.051545
0.0662378

0.3555001
0.303471
0.3348054
0.317779

Studentized Deviance Residual by Predicted

192

L-R
ChiSquare
0.2869843
0.3046783
0.0240703
0.0426218

Prob>ChiSq

Lower CL

Upper CL

0.5922
0.5810
0.8767
0.8364

-0.968335
-0.479881
-0.781712
-0.620921

0.4467239
0.7226748
0.5484838
0.6397954
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